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Scotland’s Budget:  2016 
The Fraser of Allander Institute is Scotland’s leading economic research institute with over 40 
years’ experience of researching, analysing and commentating on the Scottish economy. It is 
widely regarded as Scotland’s expert authority on economic policy issues.  
The ‘Fraser’ undertakes a unique blend of cutting-edge academic research, alongside applied 
commissioned economic consultancy in partnership with business, local and national government 
and the third sector.  
The Fraser of Allander has a unique mix of staff expertise, experiences and backgrounds that 
enables it to bring together cutting-edge economic methods and techniques with practical policy 
solutions and business strategies. 
For over 40 years, The Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary has been the leading 
publication on the Scottish economy providing authoritative and independent analysis of the 
Scottish economy.   
The Fraser of Allander Institute is a research institute of the Department of Economics and is part 
of Strathclyde Business School, Scotland’s leading business school.   
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Welcome to this first annual briefing on the Fraser of Allander Institute's Scotland’s Budget report. 
The delivery of new powers to the Scottish Parliament has coincided with an increasing focus on 
the role of fiscal policy in supporting economic growth - not least as we reflect on the limits of 
monetary policy in a post-Brexit world. As a consequence, the forthcoming Scottish Budget is of 
crucial importance to all key stakeholders in Scotland's economy. 
All of us recognise the need for more informed debate around the policy choices and priorities 
which can best encourage and sustain a thriving Scottish economy and we are delighted to be 
supporting the Fraser of Allander Institute and Mackay Hannah in facilitating such an important 
debate.  
At Morton Fraser we represent key stakeholders across business, central & local government and 
the third sector as well as individuals and families. The common thread across all of these 
stakeholders is a shared interest in helping to deliver a more prosperous Scotland and the 
recognition that Scotland's Budget can be a key plank in that success. 
I have no doubt that the Fraser of Allander Institute’s Scotland’s Budget report will be a key 
reference point for all of us with a stake in Scotland's economic future. 
Chris Harte 
Chief Executive 
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Foreword 
There has never been a greater need than there is today for independent analysis and comment 
on the fiscal opportunities and challenges facing Scotland. 
Arguably there has been such a need for decades, but with the onset of considerably greater tax 
and welfare powers from next April, and the ongoing debate about Scotland’s constitutional and 
economic future, informed analysis and commentary from an independent source is vital.    
Once the ‘Smith Commission’ powers are fully transferred, the Scottish Parliament will have 
responsibility for raising around 30% of the total tax revenues raised in Scotland. This will rise to 
40% once the proposed partial assignment of Scottish VAT revenues is incorporated. Similarly, 
around 50% of the Scottish budget will now be funded directly by the revenues raised in Scotland 
rather than simply relying on a block grant from Westminster. The Scottish Government will also 
have new borrowing powers which, while relatively modest in terms of the overall size of the 
Scottish economy, are nevertheless an important new economic tool in the policy-making 
process. 
These new powers will also usher in a radically new framework for how policy is developed, 
scrutinised and implemented. New arrangements for managing economic risks, delivering the 
annual budget scrutiny process and determining intergovernmental relations between the UK and 
Scottish Governments will all be needed.   
Fiscal devolution on this scale is largely unprecedented internationally and certainly within the 
UK.  
Delivering these new powers in ‘normal’ times would be challenging enough. But as today’s 
report highlights, they are being delivered at a time of significant fiscal challenge and economic 
uncertainty. Ambitious programmes of reform are vital if we are to ensure continued access to 
high quality public services with much fewer resources. Urgent action is needed to grow our 
economy – not just in the light of the current Brexit uncertainty and the downturn in Scotland’s oil 
and gas sector – but also to face up to the longer term challenges of an ageing population, rising 
inequality, technological change and rapid globalisation.  
There is now an unprecedented responsibility on the Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Government to boldly exercise these new and existing powers with skill and insight to realise the 
vision of sustainable prosperity in Scotland.   
Moreover, it places a significant responsibility on Scottish civic society – its business and 
academic communities, organisations, the media and, indeed, individuals – to conduct and inform 
a constructive and thoughtful debate, founded on the best evidence and experience available.   
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The Fraser of Allander Institute – and this Seminar on the outlook, choices and challenges for the 
next Scottish budget – aims to take up this responsibility.   
Scotland’s Budget 2016 provides an objective assessment of the outlook for the Scottish budget. 
Not everything is known with certainty. It unashamedly poses more questions than answers. The 
aim is to set out the evidence base for a frank discussion about the choices and challenges the 
government will face when setting priorities for the new parliamentary term.  
Today’s publication sets the context for debate. We will follow this up with further analysis once 
the Scottish Government Draft Budget is published.  
In celebrating the Fraser of Allander’s 40th anniversary earlier this year, the University of 
Strathclyde outlined its plans to invest in the long-term future of the Fraser of Allander. We are 
delighted that others – including the Scottish Funding Council and Asianomics – are working with 
us to help deliver on our ambition for a rigorously non-aligned body of work that unambiguously 
seeks to inform the debate on Scotland’s fiscal outlook through the highest-quality evidence and 
analysis. 
This will be a lively debate, and I urge everyone whatever your background or interests to work 
with us in the months and years ahead. Challenge our assumptions and analysis, agree and 
disagree with our conclusions and help us to inform the debate. Your input in shaping the future 
work priorities and research agenda of the Fraser of Allander Institute will be crucial.  
The coming months and years may turn out to be the most important period of economic and 
fiscal policy debate Scotland has known; we will do our best to analyse and inform that debate 
and we invite you to join us in doing so.   
Professor Andrew Goudie 
Chair, Fraser of Allander Institute Advisory Board 
13 September 2016 
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Executive Summary  
x The fiscal responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament are expanding rapidly. Around 40% of 
devolved expenditure will soon be funded by tax revenues collected in Scotland – a figure that 
will rise to 50% once half of VAT revenues are assigned. 
 
x The Scottish Government budget will in the future now depend upon two key elements –  
 
1. The remaining Scottish block grant as determined by ‘the Barnett Formula’; and,  
 
2. The growth in devolved tax revenues, most crucially income tax. 
 
x This means that Scotland’s economic performance – or more accurately, Scotland’s relative 
performance – will have a greater bearing on the spending plans of Holyrood than ever before. 
 
x The Scottish Government will also have the opportunity to vary its budget through the specific 
tax policy choices that it makes. Once new social security powers are devolved, it will be able 
to determine how much of its budget to dedicate to these areas.    
 
x The Smith Commission’s proposals were intended to introduce both greater risk and greater 
reward to the Scottish budget. However with additional economic uncertainty following the EU 
referendum, a weakening UK fiscal position, ongoing UK welfare reform, and a fragile Scottish 
economy, the devolution of these new tax and social security powers could not have come at 
a more challenging time. There is a real risk that this new framework will only add strain on 
Scotland’s public finances at least in the near term.   
 
Outlook for the Scottish economy 
 
x The Scottish economy remains fragile. Growth has lagged behind that in the UK as a whole 
over the past year with growth of just 0.6%, compared to UK growth of 1.7%.  
 
x Early signs of an improving outlook for 2016 have been dented by the uncertainty caused by 
the EU referendum. Prospects now look much more challenging than they did at the Scottish 
elections in May 2016.  
 
x The uncertainty over the impact of Brexit will likely lead to a deterioration in the fiscal positions 
of both the UK and Scotland. The UK Government has abandoned its target to achieve a 
budget surplus by 2019-20.  
 
x How the new Chancellor chooses to react will have implications for that part of the Scottish 
budget that will still be financed by a block grant from Westminster.  
 
x In turn, how Scotland copes with the ‘shock’ of Brexit – on top of the ongoing challenges in the 
oil and gas sector – will be crucial for determining the outlook for devolved tax revenues.   
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Outlook for the Scottish Budget: 2016-17 to 2020-21 
x The Scottish budget has faced unprecedented cuts since 2010. This year, Scotland’s resource
budget is around 5% lower in real terms than it was in 2010-11. Capital spending has been hit
particularly hard, down 12% in real terms since 2010-11.
x The outlook looks just as – if not more – challenging.
x The new Chancellor has indicated that he is prepared to ‘reset’ UK fiscal policy. It would be
wrong however, to assume that this means an immediate end to fiscal consolidation. With a
weaker economic outlook and rising inflation putting pressure on the welfare budget, further
departmental spending cuts are now even more likely over the medium term.
x Real terms cuts to the Scottish block grant are likely to continue into the next decade,
extending the period of fiscal consolidation to over 10 years.
x Under the complex arrangement for determining the Scottish Government’s budget under the
new fiscal framework, what will be crucial is how the growth in Scottish tax receipts per head
compares to the growth in equivalent tax revenues per head in the rest of the UK.
x The balance of evidence suggests that Scotland will do well to match UK economic
performance at least in the short-term.
x The Scottish Government has outlined a number of tax increases and tax cuts. On balance,
our assessment is that these will increase the Scottish budget, albeit by a modest amount.
Overall the uplift is less than 1% of the total budget.
x In this report, we set out a range of possible scenarios for the Scottish budget under
alternative outcomes for UK and Scottish fiscal policy.
x Even before the EU referendum outcome, the Scottish budget was facing real terms cuts over
the next few years driven largely by the plans set out by the previous Chancellor George
Osborne. Our new findings suggest that the Scottish budget could be cut by between 3% – 4%
percent in real terms by 2020-21 and up to 6% – around £1.6 billion – under a worst case
scenario.
x To put this in context, cuts of that scale are more than the entire budgets for the Finance and
Economy; Fair Work, Skills and Training; Culture and External Affairs; and Rural Affairs, Food
and Environment portfolios combined.
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Spending commitments and priorities: 2016-17 to 2020-21 
 
x These cuts come at a time when the Scottish Government has made a number of high profile 
– and costly – new spending commitments.  
 
x The Scottish Government plans to increase health spending by £500m more than inflation by 
the end of the parliament. It has also committed to maintain real terms spending on policing 
and has a flagship policy of doubling the provision of free childcare.  
 
x Delivering these commitments will require difficult decisions and a serious re-prioritisation of 
existing spending. As an illustration, to make up the difference between an overall real-terms 
cut of up to £1.6 billion and to pay for the government’s new ambitious spending 
commitments, other ‘unprotected’ public services could face an average reduction of between 
10% to 17% (2.6% to 4.5% annually) in real terms by 2020-21. 
 
x Alongside these high profile commitments, the Scottish Government has pledged to deliver a 
number of additional priorities which will also require to be resourced. These include protecting 
further education places, free higher education tuition, new targets for educational attainment 
and more generous welfare spending. 
 
x The government is also likely to face additional spending pressures from rising inflation (which 
will erode the effective value of budgets and make certain commitments such as the real-
terms increase in health more expensive), repayments associated with revenue-financed 
capital investment programmes (including PFI and NPD programmes), demands on the pay-
bill, and the costs of delivering the new devolved welfare system.  
 
x Whilst the immediacy of the challenge will clearly fall on the Scottish Government, it is vital 
that political parties from all sides set out their clear priorities – including how they will fund 
new commitments and manage the increasing demands on public services.  
 
x Local government will likely be a focal point for debate. As an area of ‘unprotected spend’, our 
analysis suggests that the grant to local government could be reduced by around £1 billion on 
a like-for-like basis by 2020-21 – with increases in business rate and council tax income only 
partially offsetting these cuts.  
 
x Cuts to local services are likely to become increasingly apparent in the years ahead. This is 
likely to set the terms for a wider debate about the future of local government in the run up to 
the local council elections in May next year. 
 
x The scale of the challenges facing the public finances means that bold and radical solutions 
will be needed. Business-as-usual is not an option.  
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Choices, challenges and opportunities 
x The budget challenge facing the Scottish Government is arguably the toughest since coming 
to power in 2007.  
 
x But at the same time, the government will have unprecedented autonomy to shape the 
distribution of incomes, the incentives facing individuals and businesses alike, and the 
effectiveness by which economic and social policy objectives can be achieved.  
 
x To take this debate forward, we still require greater clarity over the underlying vision for fiscal 
policy in Scotland in the light of the new tax and welfare powers. What are the primary 
outcome objectives we are trying to achieve? How much resource is required to deliver these 
outcomes, and how will they be paid for? 
 
x In this final chapter, we highlight key themes we think should frame the debate in the run up to 
the publication of the Scottish Draft Budget later in the year.  
 
x First, budget decisions need to be based much more explicitly on intended outcomes rather 
than funding inputs. There also needs to be greater recognition of the opportunity costs of 
spending decisions, particularly over the medium to long-term.  
 
x Second, with Scotland’s new tax powers the debate can move beyond simply deciding how 
best to distribute a (tight) overall spending envelope. These powers provide a set of tools to 
vary revenue but also to achieve wider objectives around re-distribution, growth, efficiency and 
the overall balance of tax and spend in Scotland. There are important constraints however, 
and policy needs to be underpinned by explicit recognition of the strategic objectives that are 
being targeted, and the costs and practical challenges underlying tax policy choices.  
 
x Third, to have an informed debate about Scotland’s fiscal future and how best to use these 
new powers, the role of Parliament and civic Scotland in scrutinising and influencing budgetary 
plans should be strengthened. A renewed emphasis on multi-year budgeting, long-term 
strategic planning and transparency will all help assist in preparing Scotland to best meet the 
challenges and opportunities ahead. 
 
x These three questions will form the basis of the work programme of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute in the months ahead.  
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Chapter 1: Outlook for the 
Scottish economy 
x The fiscal responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament are expanding rapidly, with new
powers over taxation and welfare.
x Around 40% of devolved expenditure will now be funded by tax revenues collected in
Scotland – a figure that will rise to 50% once VAT revenues are assigned.
x Crucially, Scotland’s economic performance – or more accurately, Scotland’s economic
performance relative to the UK – will soon have a much greater bearing on public spending
in Scotland than ever before.
x Under the new fiscal framework, Scotland’s budget will be no better and no worse off
relative to the current funding arrangement, provided growth in Scotland’s devolved
revenues matches the growth of comparable revenues in the rest of the UK (rUK). If
Scotland outperforms the UK on this basis then resources will rise, if Scotland
underperforms, resources will fall.
x All of which makes the outlook for Scotland’s economy presented here key to
understanding the outlook for the Scottish budget.
x These new fiscal powers come at a time when the Scottish economy remains fragile.
Growth over the past year of just 0.6% has lagged the UK (1.7% on a comparable basis).
x Early signs of an improving outlook for 2016 have been hindered by the EU referendum
result. Prospects for the next few years – in both Scotland and the UK – look challenging.
x There are two key reasons for this –
1. A period of uncertainty as the terms of ‘exit’ from the EU are negotiated is unavoidable.
This carries risks for investment, household incomes and growth; and,
2. Over time, there is a high probability that trade and investment will be damaged by the
decision to become less integrated with the EU. This will have a permanent impact on
the economy’s long-term prospects.
x Whilst the immediate risks are on the downside, it is important to not over-state them.
Exiting the EU is materially different from the financial crisis of 2008-09 when the global
systemic effects were more significant.
x The effects of the UK leaving the EU are likely to be long-term with any benefits at best
undetermined and highly uncertain.
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The Scottish economy remains fragile. Although there is significant uncertainty 
over the immediate impact of the EU referendum outcome, most economists 
believe that the outlook has weakened as a result. The future direction of the 
Scottish and UK economies will have important implications for Scotland’s 
budget. Given recent data trends, Scotland will do well to match the UK’s 
performance in the near-term.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Scottish Parliament will soon oversee annual public spending of around £40 billion, control 
all land and property taxation, and be predominantly responsible for income taxation in Scotland. 
Around 40% of ‘devolved expenditures’ will be funded by tax revenues raised in Scotland– a 
figure that will rise to 50% once half of VAT revenues are assigned to Holyrood1. 
Scotland’s budget and public spending outlook will now depend upon two key elements –  
x The block grant as determined by the ‘the Barnett formula’; and, 
 
x The growth in devolved tax revenues.  
Under the Scotland Act (2016) and its new fiscal framework, UK economic performance and 
spending decisions taken at Westminster will continue to set the overall envelope for Scottish 
public spending through the Barnett formula.  
However from April 2017, Scotland’s block grant will be adjusted (i.e. reduced) to take account of 
the new devolved tax revenues. Whether Scotland is better or worse off as a result of these new 
powers will entirely depend upon how Scotland’s economy performs.   
For a given policy stance, the Scottish budget will effectively be no better or no worse off provided 
that Scotland matches the growth per head in devolved tax receipts (and devolved welfare 
spending) in the rest of the UK. If Scotland outperforms the rest of the UK economically resources 
will rise, and if it underperforms resources will fall.  
This chapter therefore assesses the economic outlook for both Scotland and the UK.  
This is not straightforward. There is significant uncertainty over the immediate economic (and 
longer-term) prospects following the UK decision to leave the EU.  
Over the long-run (i.e. 15+ years), most economists predict that trade, labour mobility, investment 
and productivity will be damaged by weaker integration with our largest trading partner. Whilst 
these long-term risks are well evidenced, the short-run dynamics are more complex and 
uncertain.  
                                                          
1
 Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (2016) - http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/08/2132  
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The near-term economic outlook will impact on Scotland’s budget through a number of different 
channels –  
1. The impact of the decision to leave the EU on the UK public finances could have knock-
on effects to Scotland’s block grant. The IFS estimate a negative shock to the public 
finances of between £24 billion and £39 billion by 2019-20 compared to pre-referendum 
forecasts2;  
 
2. The potential policy response of the UK Government to the EU referendum outcome 
could also have spill-over effects to Scotland’s block grant. For example, any stimulus to 
infrastructure to stave off recession or alternatively, a new round of fiscal consolidation to 
combat a rising deficit, could change future spending plans in Scotland; and,  
 
3. The outlook for Scotland’s economic performance relative to the UK will determine future 
devolved revenues. In the immediate term, two factors will be crucial – whether or not 
Scotland is hit more or less significantly by Brexit than the UK as a whole; and, the extent 
to which the recent divergence in growth between Scotland and the UK continues.   
Over the course of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 we set out a range of scenarios both for the 
economy and fiscal policy based on these three different channels.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 summarises the economic performance of the 
Scottish economy over the past year. Section 1.3 focusses on the labour market given the 
significance of developments here for devolved tax revenues. Section 1.4 sets out the key 
channels through which the outcome of the EU referendum may shape the growth path of the 
Scottish economy over the next few years. Section 1.5 summarises the outlook for the UK as a 
whole.  Section 1.6 presents our forecasts for growth in Scotland. Section 7 concludes.  
 
1.2 Scotland’s recent economic performance 
The Scottish economy continues to be fragile. Over the twelve months to Q1 2016, the Scottish 
economy grew by 0.6% - below its long-term average3. The data also points to an ongoing 
divergence between Scotland and the UK where growth was 2.0% (or 1.7% excluding oil and 
gas). Production and manufacturing in particular have been dragging down overall growth – Chart 
1.1.  
  
                                                          
2
 See Emmerson et al. (2016) https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8296  
3
 It should be noted that the headline Scottish Quarterly GDP figures exclude output from the North Sea. Under UK statistical 
definitions, the North Sea is classified as part of the ‘extra-regio’ territory. The decline in the sector will however, through both 
the supply chain which services the North Sea and by lowering incomes, still have a significant impact on the Scottish Quarterly 
GDP statistics – see Box 1.1.   
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Chart 1.1:  Scottish GDP sector performance: 2014–2016 (excluding construction – Chart 1.4) 
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics 
When measured in terms of output per head – arguably the more relevant indicator of 
performance given the focus of the fiscal framework on tax receipts per capita – a similar story 
emerges. Scotland grew more strongly in 2014 but since then the UK has grown more quickly 
(Chart 1.2) – with growth in Scotland of 0.4% compared to the UK’s 1.4% over the past year.   
Chart 1.2:   Scottish & UK GDP per head: 2014-2016 
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics 
The pace of growth in Scotland had been weakening further immediately prior to the EU 
referendum. In the first three months of the year, growth was flat (i.e. 0.0%) with the production 
(largely manufacturing) and construction sectors both contracting. Growth in the services sector 
was relatively strong though slower than the UK as a whole – Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1:  Scottish GDP growth (%) by sector, Q1 2016 
 GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Quarterly Growth 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -1.5 +0.4 
UK  
 
+0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 +0.6 
Annual Growth 
 
+0.6 +2.2 -3.9 +4.8 +1.3 
UK +2.0 +1.4 +0.3 +0.2 +2.5 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics 
There have been three key drivers of the recent performance in the Scottish economy.  
Firstly, the ongoing impact of the downturn in the North Sea continues to have a significant 
impact on the domestic oil and gas supply chain. Manufacturing is down nearly 5.5% over the 
year with the Metals, Metal Products and Machinery sub-sector falling nearly 23% since 2014, in 
part due to the challenges facing the oil and gas sector, but also wider structural weaknesses 
including a number of large plant closures – Chart 1.3.  
Chart 1.3:  Challenges in manufacturing linked to the North Sea: 2014-2016  
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics 
Secondly, growth in recent quarters had been boosted by a sharp rise in construction, driven 
primarily by public infrastructure spending. This pace of growth could only be expected for so 
long. As it has tailed-off, so has overall growth – Chart 1.4.  
At the same time, growth in the services sector, whilst growing relatively robustly, has been 
slower than for the UK as a whole. Over the year, activity in the services sector is up 1.3% in 
Scotland vs. 2.5% in the UK. 
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Chart 1.4:  Strong rise in construction appears to be tailing-off: 2014-2016 
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics 
Thirdly, the weak growth in business investment witnessed over the past couple of years has 
further decelerated. New experimental statistics covering the first quarter of 2016 show a sharp 
fall in business investment in Scotland, particularly linked to construction of new plant – Chart 1.5. 
Scotland’s net trade position also acted as drag on growth over the past year.  
Chart 1.5:  Fall in investment Q1 2016:  QonQ %change in aggregate Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF), by components 
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts, August, 2016 
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Box 1.1:  The impact of oil and gas slowdown on the Scottish economy 
Under the UK statistics classification, the Continental Shelf is classified as part of the ‘extra-
regio’ territory and any economic activity here – including oil and gas extraction – does not 
typically appear in Scotland’s headline GDP measures. The Scottish Government however, 
publishes supplementary data which includes North Sea output as part of its Quarterly National 
Accounts series4. This shows that oil and gas remains a significant component of the total 
Scottish economy (based on a geographical share of the UK Continental Shelf), although its 
contribution has declined sharply in recent years.  
Chart 1.6:  North Sea output as a share of total Scottish GDP: 2000-2015 
 
Source:  Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts, August, 2016 
Indeed, total Scottish GDP in current prices including a geographical share of North Sea output 
actually fell by 1.2% on a 4Q-on-4Q basis during 2015.  
Tracing the economic impact of developments in oil and gas markets in Scotland is not 
straightforward. The vast majority of investment in the sector is driven by international energy 
markets far beyond Scotland. Furthermore, profits are typically dispersed across multi-national 
conglomerates and many offshore employees live outside of Scotland.  
Official statistics5 show that around 30,000 people in Scotland were employed in ‘extraction of 
crude petroleum and natural gas and mining support service activities’ in 2014. This excludes 
the jobs supported by the spending power of the industry (e.g. with local businesses). These 
wider activities are significant – for example, international sales from Scotland’s oil and gas 
supply chain were around £11.2 billion in 2013-14.  Oil and Gas UK estimate that the industry 
supports approximately 375,000 jobs in the UK when all such elements are included6.  
                                                          
4
 See http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/SNAP/QNAS 
5
 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/Publications/GrowthSectors/Database  
6
 Oil and Gas UK Economic Report 2015: http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/economic-report-2015.cfm  
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Since the sharp fall in the oil price toward the end of 2014, on and off-shore activity has been 
reduced. Operating expenditures fell 15% in 2015 and are expected to fall further in 2016. 
Investment is down 20% and exploration is at its lowest level since 1965 with just 13 
exploration wells drilled in 2015.  
This has hit employment and earnings. Over the year to July 2016, the Claimant Count rose by 
56% in Aberdeen City and 92% in Aberdeenshire. Whilst actual levels of unemployment remain 
below the Scottish average, such increases are indicative of the scale of the challenge across 
the North East including in hotel occupancy rates, retail footfall and business services.  
The decline in the North Sea has two key implications for Scotland’s budget. 
First, the North Sea has been a major source of revenue for the UK Exchequer over the years 
– over £100 billion in tax revenues between 1998 and 2014. As a result of falling revenues and
tax concessions, the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has forecast that North Sea 
revenues will be in the low hundreds of millions at best over each year of the 5-year forecast 
horizon (and were around £50m in 2015-16). To the extent that the sharp fall in North Sea 
revenues weakens the UK public finances, this will have an impact on Scotland’s block-grant 
via reduced UK public spending.  
Second, and of much greater significance in this context are the potential implications for 
devolved tax revenues including income tax. Through both direct employment and jobs in the 
wider supply chain, the North Sea has been a major contributor to earnings and employment 
growth in Scotland for over four decades, not least from the above average wages and 
spending power of those who work in the sector. If earnings and employment continue to fall, 
this will weaken the outlook for Scottish income tax, VAT revenues and property taxes.  
The early indications are that growth remained relatively weak in the second quarter of 2016, 
even prior to the EU referendum result being announced. Growth is forecast to remain weak7. 
Pre-EU referendum business surveys reported challenging trading conditions, but there was also 
tentative evidence of a more positive outlook for the second half of 2016.  
The Royal Bank of Scotland Scottish Business Monitor – produced by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute (FAI) and published just before the referendum – reported a net +12% of firms expecting 
business volumes to rise over the next six months, with rising optimism across most sectors and 
parts of the country8. This positivity was seriously dented by the EU referendum outcome – see 
Box 1.3.  
One (slightly) positive note has been the recent upward revision to 2015’s performance with the 
economy now estimated to have been more resilient than first thought. 2015 annual growth (4Q 
on 4Q) is estimated to have been +2.1% up from the +1.9% published earlier this year.  
7
 Moreover, a one off statistical ‘event’ is likely to have a major bearing on Scottish Q2 GDP figures. The closure of Longannet 
power station at the end of March could take anything up to 0.4 percentage points off the headline number for Scotland.  
8
 Royal Bank of Scotland Business Monitor: http://www.rbs.com/news/2016/june/scottish-businesses-optimistic-about-growth-
prospects-.html  
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Chart 1.7:  Revisions to Scottish GDP make 2015 better than previously thought 
Source:  Scottish Government, Q1 GDP Statistics
Box 1.2:  Scotland’s recent economic performance – implications for the new fiscal 
regime 
It is clear that 2015 was challenging for Scotland’s economy and 2016 is likely to be just as 
tough. The balance of probability is that – even before accounting for Brexit – the Scottish 
economy is likely to grow more slowly than the UK over the near-term.  
This performance has two important implications under the new fiscal framework. 
Firstly, 2016-17 represents the ‘base-year’ for the devolution of income tax revenues (by far the 
largest power being transferred). All else being equal, a weaker performance in 2016-17 will 
lead to a smaller deduction in Scotland’s block grant than would otherwise have been the case. 
This is because the initial deduction is designed to be revenue neutral (i.e. ‘no-detriment’).  
Secondly, it is far from clear that Scotland’s relatively weaker performance has been driven by 
temporary factors. If the recent slowdown in the North Sea is part of a more sustained trend 
then the potential risks to the Scottish budget could be significant. Indeed, the lack of fiscal 
support mechanisms to counteract an asymmetric structural decline in a sector that Scotland is 
more heavily concentrated in is a key weakness embedded within the new fiscal framework. 
Whilst there are protections to guard against temporary divergences in economic performance, 
and slowdowns common to both Scotland and the UK, there are no new mechanisms to 
protect devolved services during sustained structural slowdowns. As a result Scotland’s budget 
is now much more exposed to risks that the Scottish Government has limited ability to mitigate. 
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1.3 Recent labour market trends 
Consistent with the wider economy, Scotland’s labour market performance has been mixed. 
Developments in the labour market will be crucial for future tax revenues under the new fiscal 
framework. The key drivers of income tax and VAT are employment and earnings.  
Since the global financial crisis and the peak in unemployment in late 2009 and early 2010, 
employment has recovered strongly albeit to a slightly lesser extent than in the UK as a whole. 
Chart 1.8:  Unemployment has remained flat between 5.5% and 6% for the last two years 
Source:  ONS LFS, August, 2016
Whilst Scotland currently has a higher unemployment rate and lower employment rate than the 
UK as a whole, unemployment is now back at levels last witnessed in 2009.  
Table 1.2:  The UK labour market, Apr-Jun 2016 
Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 74.1% 5.2% 21.7% 
England 74.8% 4.9% 21.2% 
Wales 72.2% 4.3% 24.4% 
N. Ireland 69.0% 6.0% 26.4% 
UK 74.5% 4.9% 21.6% 
Source:  ONS, LFS August, 2016
Below the headline figures however, the data are slightly less positive. Whilst employment levels 
and rates are at near record levels, hours worked have fallen whilst the number of people working 
part-time has increased. Chart 1.9 tracks the performance of both average hours worked and the 
share of total employment that is full-time since 2006-07. On both measures, the labour market 
remains weaker than it was prior to the financial crisis.  
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Chart 1.9:  Hours worked and full-time employment lower than pre-recession average in Scotland 
 
Source:  ONS, APS August 2016 and FAI calculations 
On earnings, the data is also mixed. After a period of significant falls in household incomes as a 
result of low (or fixed) nominal wages being eroded by rising inflation, across the UK there have 
been signs of a degree of recovery in real wages – at least in the private sector – although 
earnings remain well below previous levels. Job insecurity has also increased.  
The strong performance in the labour market belies a significant worsening of labour productivity 
growth in recent years. Productivity is a measure of the value of output produced per hour worked 
in the economy. In the UK, productivity growth averaged 2% per year until the mid-2000s, but has 
slowed significantly since.  
Scotland has seen a similar slowing trend – Chart 1.10 – although Scotland has fared better than 
the UK as a whole with the gap between the two narrowing in recent years.  
The recent trend of weak productivity growth is not unique to Scotland or the UK, but is evident 
worldwide. The precise causes of this productivity puzzle remain a mystery, although there have 
been plenty of explanations proposed – including low levels of investment in the public and 
private sectors, limited investment in R&D and innovation, poor access to finance, inhibited 
‘creative destruction’ processes as a result of financial sector restructuring, and the nature of 
recent technological developments.  
If Scotland is to grow its revenues through faster growth then tackling relatively weak 
performance – and the drivers of this performance, a lower propensity to export and 
internationalise, weak business investment, lower innovation etc – will be key. 
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Chart 1.10:  Productivity growth in Scotland 
 
Source: Scottish Government productivity statistics9 
 
1.4 The impact of Brexit on the Scottish economic outlook  
Over the long-run (i.e. 15+ years), most economists predict that the decision to leave the EU will 
damage trade, labour mobility and investment. Any economic benefits that Brexit might bring are 
as yet unclear and by no means certain. 
Whether or not the decision to leave the EU leads to a permanent reduction in the rate of growth 
or the level of output is as yet unclear. On the one hand once the economy adjusts to life outside 
of the EU, output could simply be a permanent step below the level it otherwise would have been 
in each and every year. By permanently reducing the capacity of the economy, one consequence 
is that the amount of resources that can be devoted to public spending will fall.   
There is the potential however, for a more damaging impact if it were to confine both Scotland 
and the UK to a lower long-term growth rate (perhaps via a hit to productivity growth). Productivity 
– the key to long-term prosperity – may be weaker if leaving the Single Market reduces some 
combination of competition, product specialisation, skilled migration, inward investment and 
financial integration.  
Whilst the long-term risks are pretty clear and well-evidenced, the short-run dynamics are more 
complex and uncertain.  
There are two key channels through which the decision to leave the EU is expected to drive 
growth in the near future.  
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/PROD2014  
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Transition effects 
As highlighted above, the decision to leave the EU is forecast to have a detrimental impact on 
long-term economic prospects. Investment, household incomes, employment and the long-run 
supply potential of the economy could all be lower although any effects may take time to emerge. 
Trade could be hit particularly hard. The EU accounts for just over 40% of all of Scotland’s 
international exports (i.e. excluding exports to rUK) – more than North America, Asia, South 
America, the Middle East and Australasia combined. Many companies in Scotland (and the UK) 
are also part of complex international supply chains. This means that it is not just access to 
export markets but also EU imports which are important.  
Chart 1.11:  The importance of EU exports – Scottish international exports by destination: 2014 
Source:  Scottish Government, Export Statistics Scotland
In recent years, Scotland has performed well in international investment – rivalling the South East 
of England as the second biggest location for FDI projects after London – driven, in part, by a 
skilled workforce but also the UK as an access point to the Single Market. FDI has strong links to 
productivity through the transfer of knowledge, skills, best practice, technology, and innovation.  
To the extent that FDI flows could be at risk from Brexit, growth will be slower than would 
otherwise have been the case.  
Table 1.3:  EU and foreign-owned enterprises in Scotland: 2015 
Number of Enterprises Employment in Scotland Total Scottish Turnover (£m) 
EU-Owned 970 115,890 34,006 
Other foreign-owned 1,340 198,170 55,254 
All foreign-owned 2,310 314,060 89,260 
Source:  Scottish Government, ONS, IDBR
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However, businesses will not, and cannot, adjust their plans overnight. Plant and machinery are 
immobile in the short-run. Moreover, for the time being Scotland and the UK remain within the 
EU. In terms of trade, regulation and free movement, nothing has changed thus far.  
It is likely to be only a matter of time however, before expectations of reduced integration feed 
through to day-to-day investment, production operations, R&D activities, employment and 
household spending decisions.  
Our Brexit survey of businesses published earlier this summer, 60% of respondents believed that 
Brexit would either have a ‘slightly negative’ or ‘very negative’ impact on their investment plans – 
see Box 1.3.  
Box 1.3:  Initial Scottish business reaction to EU referendum outcome 
To help obtain a picture of how businesses are reacting to the decision to leave the EU, we 
undertook a survey of Scottish companies shortly after the referendum10. 
The key conclusion was that of the firms surveyed, just over 60% said Brexit will have a 
negative impact on their business and only 19% believe that it will have a positive impact. One 
third said the impact would be ‘very negative’. 
Chart 1.12:  Do you think that the result of the referendum will be positive or negative for your 
business? 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander post-Brexit Survey (04-12 July) 
We followed this up by asking firms about their future investment and recruitment plans.  
Around 40% said that it could have a negative impact on investment with a further 40% 
responding that it was unlikely to lead to any change. Less than 10% said it was likely to have 
a positive impact. The responses were similar for both investment and recruitment.  
 
                                                          
10
 https://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/feeds/news.aspx?id=1014  
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Table 1.4:  “To what extent do you believe that the referendum result will have an impact on 
your business plans?” 
Investment Recruitment 
Significantly positive 4% 2% 
Slightly positive 4% 3% 
No Change 40% 55% 
Slightly negative  19% 22% 
Significantly negative 19% 12% 
Don’t know 13% 7% 
Source:  Fraser of Allander post-Brexit Survey (04-12 July) 
One particularly striking result from the survey was the lack of preparation for the UK exiting 
the EU. More than 85% of firms reported ‘no preparation’ – or ‘very little’ – had been 
undertaken. This is consistent with evidence for the UK as a whole.  
The lower exchange rate will help dampen some of these effects. Since the referendum, the 
sterling effective exchange rate has fallen nearly 10%, and 15% since its peak in November 
2015, although it has bounced back slightly in recent weeks. A fall in sterling boosts the 
competitiveness of exporters and the tourism sector, although as costs rise this ‘advantage’ will 
disappear over time. 
At the same time, sectors including retail, which rely on imports will see costs rising. The lower 
value of sterling cuts the real incomes of Scottish households as imports – particularly food and 
fuel – become more expensive.  
Macroeconomic stability 
At the UK level, the decision to leave the EU was clear. However, the exact terms of exit are 
unknown and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Consequently, the referendum result has ushered in a period of significant economic uncertainty 
– Chart 1.13. In response, businesses and households tend to postpone spending and
investment. 
Macroeconomic uncertainty is not uncommon, but when it does occur it can act as a significant 
headwind to growth.  
However more often than not, once the uncertainty is resolved the macroeconomic impacts turn 
out to be temporary. Decisions that have been postponed can be implemented at a future date. 
However, the longer uncertainty continues the greater the risk of permanent damage.  
The current economic uncertainties are exacerbated by policy uncertainty – such as the shape of 
any EU trade deal. This creates a lack of clarity around the fundamental structure of the 
economic and political environment that businesses will operate within.  
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Chart 1.13:  Sharp rise in external financial and economic uncertainty Deloitte CFO Survey – “% 
uncertainty very high” 
Source:  Thomson Reuters Datastream
On balance, the expectation is that the UK-EU negotiations will not be straightforward and neither 
will the associated financial market dynamics. Exchange rates and stock prices could deviate 
substantially from ‘fundamentals’ for periods of time.  This instability could itself act as its own 
drag on growth. It implies a less productive use of resources than would otherwise have been the 
case. It could also lead to higher risk premiums on lending to businesses and households, 
increasing the cost of capital. This, coupled with a weakening housing market, could depress 
wealth holdings and curtail household spending.  
Government policy can help offset such uncertainty, albeit partially and temporarily, and there is 
much speculation about what the Chancellor may do in the forthcoming Autumn Statement. The 
Bank of England has already intervened by cutting interest rates to 0.25%, increasing its 
Quantitative Easing programme and introducing a new Term Funding Scheme to ensure that 
interest rate cuts are passed-through to the real economy11.  
Relative impact between Scotland and the UK 
At this stage, it is not clear the extent to which any consequences from leaving the EU will be 
more or less significant for Scotland than for the rest of the UK.   
On the one hand, and as highlighted in Box 1.4, some factors suggest that the long-term ‘shock’ 
may be more significant in other parts of the UK than in Scotland.  
For example, from the relatively limited data that we have, the UK appears more closely 
integrated with the EU in terms of trade than Scotland. Some industries – for example the City of 
London and the major UK car manufacturing plants in the North of England and the Midlands – 
depend on access to EU markets for a significant proportion of their activity. Close proximity to 
11
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2016/008.aspx 
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potential export customers is a factor for many businesses in England and increasing this 
‘distance’ through trade barriers and restrictions will hurt firms.  
Box 1.4:  Modelling the long-term impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy 
Following a commission by the Scottish Parliament, the Fraser of Allander Institute has 
modelled the effects of Brexit on the Scottish economy. We used the FAI’s multi-regional, 
multi-sectoral model of Scotland and the rest of the UK, AMOSUK. This enables us to 
differentiate Scotland-specific effects of Brexit, compare them with the situation in the rest of 
the UK, and observe the sectoral distribution of the effects. 
Due to uncertainty about the precise form of Brexit we distinguish several potential post-Brexit 
scenarios – “Norway”, “Switzerland” and “WTO”.  
In this projection we accounted for the following potential effects of Brexit:  
x reduction of exports to EU countries due to reduced integration, divergence in 
regulation and increase in non-tariff barriers; 
 
x no contributions to the EU budget (in WTO scenario); 
 
x tariffs on exports to EU countries (in WTO scenario). 
Our forthcoming results are similar to analyses done by other organisations on the impact of 
Brexit in the UK in that – based on the modelling assumptions in our analysis – we find a 
significant negative effect of Brexit on Scottish and UK economies. Overall we find that over 
the next 10 years the level of GDP in Scotland could be between 2% and 5% (depending on 
the scenario) lower than it would otherwise have been.  
What is new in our analysis is that we can compare the potential impact on Scotland and the 
rest of the UK and identify its sectoral distribution. Our results suggest that the shock to 
Scotland from Brexit – whilst substantial – may be slightly less than for the rest of the UK, due 
to a lower level of trade integration with the EU. This is a significant finding in the context of 
the new fiscal framework.  
It is also possible that previous UK-wide research that was carried out in highly aggregated 
models underestimated the negative impact of Brexit. The reason for that is that the sectors 
that are most exposed to EU trade – and consequently suffer as a result of Brexit – also tend 
to have higher level of value added. 
However as a smaller economy, Scotland is always likely to be more susceptible to one or two 
major investment or recruitment decisions having a significant impact on overall growth and 
employment. Scotland’s productivity may also suffer disproportionately if the decision to leave the 
EU has a relatively greater negative impact on international investment. As highlighted above, 
this is an area where Scotland has been relatively successful in recent years helping to close the 
gap in productivity with the rest of the UK.  
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Levels of uncertainty may increase in Scotland if the possibility of a second independence 
referendum rises, although it is too early to measure the potential economic implications of 
different constitutional settlements, particularly given the lack of clarity over the UK’s position with 
the EU. 
1.5 The outlook for the UK 
The outlook for the UK remains – as for Scotland – highly uncertain. UK growth was better than 
expected in the run-up to the referendum and the labour market continues to operate at near 
record levels.  
However, in the first official assessment of the impact of Brexit on the economy post-referendum, 
the Bank of England’s August 2016 Inflation Report acknowledged that the outlook for UK growth 
in the short to medium term had now ‘weakened markedly’.  
The central forecast in the Bank’s August report shows real GDP to be 2.3 percentage points 
lower in 2018 compared to its pre-referendum forecast in May. Nominal earnings are expected to 
be 1.6 percentage points lower, which combined with a higher forecast for inflation implies real 
earnings being 2.8 percentage points lower.  
Employment is forecast to be lower by around 320,000 and the unemployment rate forecast is 
expected to rise from 4.9% (in the May Inflation Report) to 5.5%.   
Box 1.5:  The global economic environment 
Overall, economic conditions internationally remain finely balanced. Uncertainty over the global 
outlook had been a key source of concern, even prior to the EU referendum.  
In a number of countries, growth is close to trend but elsewhere, particularly in the largest 
emerging economies and some key advanced economies, growth has been subdued. This has 
weakened global trade and increased financial market volatility.  
The Euro Area continues to recover with growth at its healthiest since the financial crisis – at 
2.2% (annualised) in the first quarter of 2016.  
However, the uncertainty around Brexit and the depreciation in Sterling has weakened the 
outlook for Euro Area exports (around 15% of which are to the UK), whilst business and 
consumer confidence has also taken a hit. The referendum has also fuelled concerns over 
political and economic stability in some European countries including heightened questions 
over the strength of the banking system, particularly in Italy and Portugal.  
The US economy remains relatively strong, although 2016 has been a weaker year to date 
than 2015. Growth is expected to pick-up in the coming months however, driven by higher real 
wages, employment growth and higher investment.  
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Table 1.5:  Outlook for global growth: 2016-2017 
Year on Year Projections 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
World Output 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.4 
Advanced Economies 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
US 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 
Euro Area 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 
Emerging Market and 
Developing Economies 4.6 4.0 4.1 4.6 
Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2016
In 2015, China’s economy experienced its slowest year of growth (6.9%) since 1990, reflecting 
weaker investment and manufacturing activity as it rebalances towards consumption and 
service-led growth. China’s slowing growth has been a key factor behind the weakening 
outlook for emerging economies with Asian economies particularly affected. 
Concerns remain however, over emerging markets near-term prospects. Most economists 
predict a gradual recovery over the next few years but for growth to remain below trend. The 
balance of risks remains on the downside.  The greatest risk continues to be the potential 
impact of a sharp reversal of capital inflows should monetary policy in advanced economies 
tighten. With high levels of indebtedness, many emerging economies remain highly exposed. 
Alongside the Bank of England, most forecasters have significantly revised down their projections 
for UK growth. The biggest ‘hit’ is forecast for 2017 as the full effects of investor uncertainty feed 
through to the real economy.   
Table 1.6:  Independent forecasters tracked by HM Treasury – rapidly revising near-term outlook 
% growth in 2017 GDP Consumption Investment Net Trade* 
Av. forecast (June 16) +2.1 +2.2 +4.3 -0.5 
Av. ‘new’ forecast 
(since Brexit)  +0.7 +1.0 -3.8 +0.5 
Source:  HM Treasury 
* net trade contribution (% of GDP)
Within the forecasts there is a substantial degree of variability. Some economists are even 
predicting a modest UK recession in 2017. Predictions of a fall in output over an entire year 
however appear too pessimistic.  
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Table 1.7:  Latest economic growth forecasts for the UK economy – forecasts post-referendum 
2016 2017 
Barclays Capital +1.5 -0.5 
Capital Economics +1.5 +1.5 
Credit Suisse +1.0 -1.0 
Fathom +1.6 +0.6 
Oxford Economics +1.8 +1.1 
CEBR +1.6 +0.4 
Experian +1.4 +0.4 
NIESR +1.7 +1.0 
IMF +1.7 +1.3 
ITEM Club +1.9 +0.4 
Average of post referendum forecasts +1.6 +0.7 
Source:   HM Treasury
It is too early to assess the impact on the real economy. Most official data for the post-referendum 
period will not be available until late autumn. Even then, with the UK not actually leaving the EU 
until 2019 at the earliest, and with uncertainty surrounding the specifics of the post-EU economic 
relationships, we may not see major shifts in economic data for some time yet. One consequence 
is that the Chancellor may wait until next year before deciding whether to act or not.  
The greatest movements have been in the housing and commercial property sectors, where 
indicators point to noticeable falls in activity.  
The most keenly watched economy-wide statistic has been the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) 
which measures whether a balance of firms report that their activities have grown or fallen.  
The PMI is typically seen as a relatively robust indicator. However, it should also be used with 
caution, particularly during times of volatility. Responses can be driven by the views of the 
individuals surveyed rather than actual changes in activity and can – on certain occasions – 
‘overreact’ up or down.  
Table 1.8:  UK PMI points to flat growth (i.e. zero)* in Q3 2016 
Services Manufacturing Construction 
August 52.9 53.3 49.2 
July 47.4 48.3 45.9 
June 52.3 52.1 46.0 
May 53.5 50.1 51.2 
Source:  Markit 
* Above 50 suggests an expansion of activity, below 50 a contraction.
Noting these caveats, the UK PMI for both services and manufacturing fell sharply in July. Within 
that, regions such as London and the South East saw their PMI’s fall to lows not seen since the 
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financial crisis. But it has since bounced back in August, suggesting that activity remained broadly 
flat over the two month period with decisions postponed in July coming back on stream.  
In its August Inflation Report, the Bank of England reported the results from its own survey 
undertaken by its Regional Agents which shed some further light on sentiment within business by 
asking whether or not turnover and prices were forecast to rise or fall – Chart 1.14.  
Chart 1.14:  Balance of Bank of England survey responses for turnover and prices by sector 
Source:  Bank of England, August 2016
The expected effects on turnover were mostly negative, with the outlook particularly pessimistic 
for business services and construction. In contrast, manufacturing turnover was expected to rise, 
following an expected boost to export demand from the depreciation in sterling. 
1.6 Forecasts for the Scottish economy 
All of this takes us to the outlook for Scotland. Forecasting short-term growth in an environment 
where there is a considerable degree of uncertainty is challenging.   
Data on the impact on Scotland to date of the EU Referendum decision is scarce. The Bank of 
Scotland Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) survey registered a four-month low of 49.2 in July. 
Interestingly, relative to the rest of the UK, the Scottish PMI held up well – the fall of 1.3 points 
compared to a UK average of 5 points. However ‘new business’ activity, often seen as a leading 
indicator of output, fell by the greatest degree for nearly four years.  
To provide an up to date assessment of economic activity in Scotland, the FAI produces monthly 
‘nowcasts’ of Scottish quarterly growth – www.fraserofallander.org.  
The advantage of a ‘nowcast’ is that it provides an indication of economic performance far in 
advance of official data. Our latest nowcast estimates growth of 0.2% in Q2 and offers little 
optimism for anything approaching a return to trend during the first half of 2016.  
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The Institute’s central forecast for Scotland is for growth to slow to 0.9% in 2016 (down from our 
1.4% forecast in June) followed by an even sharper downward revision in 2017 and 2018 to just 
0.5% and 0.7% respectively (down from 1.9% and 2.0% respectively).  
These forecasts are on the cautious side. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, they do not 
include any stimulus via a significant ‘resetting’ of fiscal policy by the UK Government. It is simply 
too early to make a definitive judgement over the possible action that the Chancellor may take in 
late autumn.  
Secondly, the forecasts include an expectation that the slowdown in the North Sea continues to 
act as a drag on growth well into 2017.  
Table 1.9:  FAI revised forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector: 2016-2018 
2016 2017 2018 
GVA 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Production 1.3 0.7 0.8 
Construction 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Services 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, July 2016
These forecasts suggest that whilst there will be a slowdown in the rate of growth, the Scottish 
economy will avoid an annual recession (i.e. a full calendar year where output falls). However, 
growth will be close to zero in individual quarters and a short ‘technical recession’ in Scotland – 
defined as two consecutive quarters of falling output – is possible. There is a distinct possibility 
that growth will be slower than for the UK as a whole.  
Growth in all sectors will slow significantly. Construction will see close to zero growth in 2017, in 
part due to the impact of the EU referendum outcome, but also from a return to trend output 
following the strong growth through 2014 and 2015.  
Of the components of demand, the expectation is that short-term uncertainty will hit investment 
and consumption over the next few years.  
Fraser of Allander Institute, September 2016 27 
Scotland’s Budget:  2016 – Chapter 1: Outlook for the Scottish economy 
Chart 1.15:  FAI forecasts for GVA growth: 2016-2018* 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, July 2016 
* Actual data up to 2015, central forecast with forecast error for 2016 – 2018
Chart 1.16:  Decomposition of revisions to FAI’s pre-referendum forecasts – sharp decline in 
investment leading the way: 2016-2018 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, July 2016 
Whilst the boost to net exports from the depreciation in the pound will support external demand in 
the short-run, it is unlikely to be sufficient to offset the wider slowdown in the economy. Indeed, 
part of the revision to growth in 2016 and 2017 is through weaker exports to the rest of the UK.  
The labour market will slow. We now predict that unemployment will rise to 7.0% in 2017. 
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Table 1.10:  FAI forecast of Scottish unemployment in central forecasts: 2016-2018 
 2016 2017 2018 
ILO unemployment 173,500 188,250 183,050 
Rate (%)1 6.5 7.0 6.8 
Note: Rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment by total economically active 
population 16+.  
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, July 2016 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
The new fiscal framework for Scotland will mean that developments in the Scottish economy will 
now have a much greater impact on future budgets than ever before.  
This chapter has shown that the potential paths for the economies of both Scotland and the UK – 
and the implications for fiscal policy – are highly uncertain.  
Overall however, the economic outlook for the UK has undoubtedly weakened over the short-
term. This is likely to increase the level of fiscal consolidation in the long-run. The Chancellor 
faces a careful balancing act between continuing to reduce the deficit and protecting the real 
economy. In the short-term, this may lead to a modest stimulus although the knock-on impact to 
the day-to-day Scottish budget may be marginal if it is concentrated on unemployment benefits, a 
boost to the UK’s trade capacity or higher capital investment.  
With the devolution of new powers, the outlook for Scotland’s economy will be crucial in 
determining the future path of the Scottish budget. Recent trends present a challenging backdrop.  
On balance, the immediate outlook for the Scottish economy appears to be more challenging 
than for the UK as a whole and Scotland will do well to match UK economic performance in the 
near-term.  
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Chapter 2: Outlook for the 
Scottish budget 
x In 2016-17, Scotland’s resource budget is 5% lower in real terms than 2010-11. The capital
budget has been hit particularly hard, down 12% in real terms since 2010-11.
x The outlook looks just as – if not more – challenging.
x The UK Government’s objective of achieving a budget surplus in 2019-20 had promised to
deliver at least a further 3 years of cuts beyond this year, with the Scottish budget projected
to fall a further 3.5% between 2016-17 and 2019-20.
x The outlook is now a little more uncertain following the EU referendum, with the Chancellor
promising to ‘reset’ UK fiscal policy. It would be wrong however, to automatically assume
that this means an end to fiscal consolidation.
x Whilst there may be a short-term uplift to individual budget lines, the weaker economic
outlook will lower tax revenues and increase the budget deficit. At the same time, higher
inflation will reduce the real-terms value of spending. Further cuts are therefore now more
likely over the medium term.
x The transfer of new fiscal powers means that the outlook for the Scottish budget is now
crucially dependent upon Scotland’s relative economic performance. The evidence
suggests that, particularly with the ongoing challenges in the North Sea, Scotland will do
well to grow its devolved revenues in line with those in the rest of the UK.
x The Scottish Government has outlined a series of new tax policies. Some of these will raise
revenue whilst others will lower it. On balance the net increase is marginal, adding less
than 1% to the Scottish Government’s resource budget.
x This chapter sets out a range of possible scenarios for the Scottish budget based upon
what may happen both to UK fiscal policy and Scottish devolved revenues.
x Overall, the Scottish Government should prepare for possible real-terms cuts of up to 6%
by 2020-21 – or around £1.6 billion over the course of the parliament.
x Coming on the back of six years of cuts, this suggests a full decade of fiscal consolidation
in the Scottish budget.
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The Scottish Government faces a challenging budget outlook and will require 
considerable skill to navigate Scotland’s public services over the course of the 
next parliament. On any realistic scenario, real-terms resources for public 
spending are likely to be highly constrained and the government should plan 
for a worst case scenario of a fall in resource of up to £1.6 billion by 2020-21.  
2.1 Introduction 
What level of resource is the Scottish Government likely to have to invest in day-to-day public 
services over the course of this parliament? And how much will it be able to invest in capital 
spending? These are the questions considered in this chapter.  
As set out in Chapter 1, Scotland’s resource budget will now depend upon two important 
elements –  
1. The Block Grant as determined by ‘the Barnett formula’; and,
2. The growth in devolved tax revenues, relative to the growth in equivalent revenues in
rUK (which determines the ‘block grant adjustment’).
For clarity on the first of these, we await the Chancellor’s response to the EU referendum and the 
UK’s weakened economic prospects in his Autumn Statement (23rd November 2016).  
The plan by George Osborne to achieve a surplus by 2019-20 has been abandoned. But this by 
no means signals an end to fiscal consolidation. By reducing the long-term capacity of the 
economy, leaving the EU is likely to prolong real-terms cuts in day-to-day public spending into the 
next decade.  
From April 2017, growth in devolved tax revenues will have a significant impact on the Scottish 
budget. Future growth in the Scottish budget will increasingly depend upon Scotland’s relative 
economic performance and tax decisions taken at Holyrood.  
Based on an assessment of the most likely scenarios for both the evolution of policy and the 
economy, the conclusion we reach is that the outlook for public spending in Scotland is likely to 
remain highly challenging over the course of this parliament.  
Between 2016-17 and 2020-21, the Scottish budget could fall by between 2.8% and 6.2% in 
real terms, equivalent to between £00 million and £1.6 billion.  
Tough choices in terms of priorities and reform will be required not just in their making but also in 
their implementation. Coming on the back of six years of real terms cuts, it is unlikely that short-
term stop gaps will be sufficient. More fundamental decisions are needed over the future direction 
of public spending and how public services are delivered and financed.   
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets out past trends in the Scottish budget whilst 
Section 2.3 summarises the new fiscal framework. Section 2.4 considers the outlook for 
Scotland’s block grant. Section 2.5 outlines the likely path for both the all-important block grant 
 Fraser of Allander Institute, September 2016 31
Scotland’s Budget:  2016 – Chapter 2:  Outlook for the Scottish budget 
adjustment (BGA) and devolved tax revenues in Scotland. Section 2.6 brings all of these 
elements together to provide an overall outlook for the Scottish budget. 
Section 2.7 assesses the revenue implications of the tax policies set out to date by the Scottish 
Government. Section 2.8 summarises the outlook for capital spending. Section 2.9 concludes.  
2.2 Past trends in the Scottish Government budget 
The challenging budget outlook anticipated for the course of this parliament comes on the back of 
a sustained period of fiscal consolidation.   
Over the first decade of devolution, Scotland’s block grant grew year on year both in cash and 
real terms. This growth went into reverse in 2010. During the financial crisis, the UK fiscal position 
deteriorated rapidly. Net borrowing peaked at £155 billion (over 10% of GDP) in 2009-10.  
Alistair Darling’s final Budget as Labour Chancellor set out plans to cut UK departmental 
spending by £56 billion by 2014-15. The incoming Coalition Government’s ‘Emergency Budget’ in 
June that year increased the scale of the planned consolidation, aiming to cut £66 billion from 
departmental spending by 2014-1512.  
Chart 2.1:  Scottish Government Budget, 1999-00 to 2020-21 
Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis, various years; FAI analysis of Budget documents 
TDEL includes RDEL (resource spending) and CDEL (capital spending) 
After 2011-12, the pace of austerity was scaled back somewhat. However by 2016-17, the 
Scottish Government resource budget (see Chart 2.1) is still around 5% lower in real-terms than 
in 2010-11.    
12
 Emmerson and Tetlow (2015) ‘Public finances under the coalition’. https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/gb/gb2015/ch1_gb2015.pdf 
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Under the plans set out by George Osborne in his March 2016 Budget, Scotland’s block grant – 
even before any changes in devolved revenues – was expected to fall further in real terms with 
cuts of around 3.5% in real terms by 2019-20.   
These plans would have taken real terms spending in Scotland back to 2005-06 levels. 
As a result of the EU referendum decision, there is now greater uncertainty around the future 
outlook for the Scottish budget. How the Scottish budget will evolve will depend on the response 
of the UK Government, and the new Chancellor, to revised economic forecasts. We consider 
likely scenarios in Section 2.4.  
Box 2.1:  The Scottish budget 
Each year the Scottish Government publishes a Draft Budget with their plans for the year 
ahead.  
Every five years or so, the UK Government undertakes a Spending Review which sets fixed 
expenditure limits for departments – including the Scottish Government – for a multi-year 
period.  
Scottish administrations have typically followed suit. The last UK Spending Review took place 
in November 2015 with detailed plans up to 2019-20 and a broad outline of spending priorities 
for 2020-21. The Scottish Government has however, so far resisted undertaking a multi-year 
Spending Review choosing to set only an annual budget for 2016-17.  
Giving evidence to the Finance Committee in June this year, Cabinet Secretary for Finance 
Derek Mackay said13: ‘With the degree of uncertainty and volatility that exists right now, it 
would be unwise to publish a three-year spending review. Therefore, we propose a one-year 
budget [in 2017-18] and will not deliver a three-year spending review at this time.’ 
The total amount of money that the Scottish Government spends is known as Total Managed 
Expenditure (TME).  
TME is split into two components – 
x Department Expenditure Limit spending (DEL) – the amount that government
departments have been allocated to spend; and,
x Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) – spending that is not controlled directly by a
department but instead varies year-on-year (such as public sector pensions).
In practice, the Scottish Government has virtually no discretion – except for the allocation of 
Non-Domestic Rate Income – over AME spending. It is the DEL element which constitutes 
discretionary spending and that which is spent on services such as the NHS, education and 
economic development.  
Within DEL, spending is further divided into Resource DEL (RDEL) and Capital DEL (CDEL). 
13
 http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=10486&mode=pdf 
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RDEL is money that is spent on day to day resources and administration such as staff costs. 
CDEL is money that is spent on investment – such as a new road or hospital. The Scottish 
Government is permitted to move RDEL spending into CDEL but not vice versa.  
Finally, RDEL contains an allocation for ‘non-cash’ elements – largely an accounting 
adjustment for depreciation. Whilst incorporated into the accounts, it is not money that can 
actually be spent by the government. Excluding these non-cash elements provides a figure 
known as Fiscal RDEL. It is this, which provides the best assessment of the discretionary day-
to-day spending power of the government, although the Scottish Government do not routinely 
publish Fiscal RDEL at a portfolio level.   
2.3 The new fiscal framework 
The Scottish Government has traditionally relied on a block grant from Westminster to finance 
virtually all of its expenditure14.  
This block grant has been determined by the Barnett formula. Barnett allocates to Scotland a 
population share of changes in ‘comparable spending’ in England. This change is added to the 
block grant in the previous year. 
Following the Scotland Act 2012 and Scotland Act 2016, a number of tax revenues are being 
devolved and assigned to the Scottish budget as part of a new fiscal framework– see Box 2.4. 
The Scottish block grant for resource spending will continue to be calculated initially by the 
‘Barnett formula’. But the block grant will then be adjusted (i.e. reduced) to take account of these 
new taxes being transferred to the Scottish Government.  
The mechanism is complex, and is described in Section 2.5. 
In terms of capital spending, the amount the Scottish Government will be able to invest will still 
largely depend on a block grant from Westminster but also be supplemented by its new borrowing 
powers15. 
Box 2.2:  Scotland’s new fiscal framework 
The fiscal framework was the most controversial part of the agreement to implement the Smith 
Commission’s recommendations. In the end, only a temporary deal was reached and it will be 
reviewed in 2021.  
In addition to setting out the mechanism for how the block grant adjustment (BGA) will operate 
– see Box 2.5 – the new framework will have other important implications.
14
 Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rates are set and collected in Scotland, but the revenue from these taxes is used to fund 
Local Government.  
15
 Technically, the Scottish Government could also shift resource spending into capital; although it is unlikely to do so in the 
future given the constraints facing its resource budget. 
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Firstly, for the first time the Scottish Government will take responsibility for significant elements 
of welfare – see Chapter 3 for a discussion.  
Secondly, the Scottish Government’s capital borrowing powers will increase. The overall limit 
on borrowing will rise to £3 billion, with an annual limit of 15% of the overall borrowing cap 
(equivalent to £450 million a year).  
Thirdly, the Scottish Government will gain increased revenue borrowing powers of up to £600 
million per annum, subject to a combined overall limit of £1.75 billion, for in-year cash 
management, forecast error and Scottish-specific economic shocks.  
Fourthly, the institutional arrangements for managing the public finances are being 
overhauled. The independent Scottish Fiscal Commission will assume responsibility for 
forecasting economic growth and devolved tax revenues.  
Fifthly, the processes for managing cash flow and variations in tax revenues between years 
will change. A new Scotland Reserve is being established. The Scottish Government will be 
able to deposit up to £700 million and draw down monies – subject to limits of £250 million for 
resource and £100 million for capital – should they need to.   
Finally, the inter-governmental relations between the Scottish and UK Governments will be 
reformed with greater equality between the two administrations in decision making, expanded 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and new arrangements for information sharing.   
To calculate Scotland’s budget under this new framework, three key elements need to be 
measured –  
x The ‘baseline’ block grant for resource spending from Westminster;
x The interaction between the adjustment to the block grant for the taxes that are devolved
to Scotland and the revenues raised from those devolved taxes in Scotland; and
x The revenue implications of any tax-policy changes that the Scottish Government decides
to implement.
We take each of these three elements in turn. 
2.4 The block grant from Westminster 
Although substantial revenues are being devolved, the overall Scottish Budget will remain closely 
tied to the fiscal decisions of the UK Government via the block grant. In this section, we therefore 
comment on the outlook for Scotland’s block grant up to the end of the parliamentary term.  
In its March 2016 Budget, the UK Government set out its spending plans and the implication for 
the Scottish block grant until 2019-20 – Table 2.1. Scotland’s resource block grant was expected 
to fall by 3.5% in real terms between 2016-17 and 2019-20. 
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The Budget did not provide an estimate for 2020-21, although it did provide a forecast for overall 
UK departmental spending in that year. On that basis, and an assumption about how much the 
Barnett consequentials could turn out to be, we have estimated the Scottish resource block grant 
for 2020-21. The assumption of the UK Government in March was for departmental spending to 
remain constant in real terms after 2019-20, once the target for surplus had been achieved. 
Table 2.1:  The Scottish Government’s RDEL block grant before tax adjustments, £m 
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Nominal terms 26,033 26,115 26,489 26,552 26,677 27,200 
Real terms (2016-17 prices) 26,423 26,115 26,021 25,546 25,188 25,178 
Source: FAI calculations 
Of course these numbers were produced before the vote to leave the EU. To what extent might 
Scotland’s block grant now change? Essentially, the answer depends on the outlook for the UK 
fiscal position and how the UK Government decides to respond. 
At the time of the March 2016 Budget, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecast that in 
2019-20 there would be a fiscal surplus of £10.4 billion in the UK (0.5% of GDP). George 
Osborne was able to say that he was on course to eliminate the deficit before the next UK 
election.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, the vote to leave the EU has undoubtedly weakened the economic – 
and fiscal – outlook. Slower growth implies reduced tax revenues, whilst higher unemployment 
implies greater pressures on public spending. Higher inflation – which has been forecast by the 
Bank of England – is likely to put further pressure on the government’s welfare bill. On the 
positive side, the UK may benefit from the part or full repatriation of its £7–8 billion annual net 
contribution to the EU, but this is unlikely to offset the fall in revenues arising from the 
deterioration in the economic outlook (see Box 2.3). 
Box 2.3:  UK net contributions to the EU 
Much was made in the referendum debate about the UK’s fiscal contribution to the EU.  Here 
we assess the extent to which leaving the EU could have a positive or negative impact on the 
public finances.  
The UK’s gross contribution in 2014 to the EU was £19.1 billion. This was the source of the 
Leave campaign’s claim that the UK “sends” £350 million per week to Europe. However, there 
are a number of problems with this figure16.  
First, this ignores the UK rebate – the amount automatically deducted from the UK’s gross 
contribution.  
16
 For a discussion see official correspondence from Sir Andrew Dilnot, Chair of the UK Statistics Authority, to Norman Lamb 
MP, 21st April 2016. https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Letter-from-Sir-Andrew-Dilnot-to-
Norman-Lamb-MP-210416.pdf  
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Second, both the UK and Scotland benefit from income received from the EU through CAP, 
structural funds and research funding. ONS estimate that once accounted for, the UK’s net 
contribution between 2010 and 2014 averaged around £7 billion, although more recent figures 
put it closer to £8 billion.   
Third, should the UK wish to retain some of the economic benefits of the EU – e.g. the Single 
Market – then some form of payment will continue. European Economic Area (such as 
Norway) members make fiscal contributions although they have no say over how such funds 
are used.  
Finally, and most significantly, the IFS estimate that the UK could face a much larger fiscal 
deficit as a result of the weakened economic outlook – even accounting for no longer making a 
financial contribution to the EU budget17. 
Following the vote to leave the EU, Chancellor Phillip Hammond has said that he will seek to 
“reset” fiscal policy. But what might he mean by a fiscal policy reset? 
In setting out a range of scenarios for the Scottish block grant, our starting point has been to 
assume that the government’s core objective over the medium term is to continue to reduce the 
fiscal deficit, in order that debt as a percentage of national income falls from its post-war high of 
80%. 
In re-setting fiscal policy, the government may change the focus of its fiscal target somewhat – 
perhaps aiming for a surplus on current spending rather than on total spending – and may 
change the period over which it hopes to achieve whatever target it sets. But fiscal consolidation 
and sustainability is likely to remain the government’s overarching objective. 
It has to be recognised that, even if it were to leave its plans for departmental spending 
unchanged, the government will run a larger deficit (and thus borrow more) than it was planning, 
given the forecast economic deterioration. In this context, and assuming that fiscal consolidation 
remains a key plank of government fiscal policy, the scope for a substantial loosening of fiscal 
policy – certainly a large increase in departmental resource spending that would generate 
consequentials for the Scottish block grant – seems unlikely.  
In the short-term, the UK Government may decide to counteract a temporary weakening of 
economic activity through one or more temporary tax cuts. Tax cuts are more effective at 
increasing consumer confidence than increasing departmental spending. At the height of the 
2008-09 recession, the UK Government announced substantial fiscal loosening on the tax side, 
including a temporary cut to VAT, a holiday on stamp duty, and a rise in the income tax personal 
allowance, but increases in spending were much more limited. 
If there is any fiscal loosening on the spending side in 2017-18 relative to March plans, it is 
perhaps most likely to come in the form of an increase in capital spending by the UK 
Government, as this is likely to be the most effective response to medium-term decline in the 
economic outlook. An increase in capital spending by the UK Government would increase the 
Scottish Government’s block grant for capita spending, via Barnett consequentials.  
                                                          
17
 See Emmerson et al. (2016) https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8296  
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In this context we model four scenarios for the Scottish resource block grant over the course of 
this parliament:– 
x ‘March spending plans’ – this scenario is based on the departmental spending plans set
out by the UK Government in the March 2016 Budget. This scenario is however,
consistent with the idea of a ‘fiscal policy’ reset as – given deteriorating revenue forecasts
following the EU Referendum – the 2019-20 surplus is unlikely to be achieved. Moreover,
it could be combined with some fiscal loosening on the tax side, such as a temporary cut
in VAT;
x ‘Fiscal stimulus on spending’ – in addition to a stimulus on the tax side, the UK Chancellor
may pencil in some additional departmental spending increases. It seems unlikely that we
will see significant real terms departmental spending increases, given the government’s
commitment to fiscal sustainability, combined with the deterioration in the revenue outlook
following the EU referendum. But for completeness we include a scenario that assumes
the Chancellor embarks on a fiscal loosening which includes an additional £1.5 billion of
UK departmental resource spending in 2017-18 (equating to an increase in the block
grant of around £100m) and 2018-19 compared to March plans, with some of this
stimulus recouped in later years.
x ‘Extended consolidation’– this assumes the Chancellor maintains the existing
departmental spending plans over the period to 2019-20, but continues the pace of fiscal
consolidation in subsequent years, within the context of an objective to reduce the deficit
over the medium term.
x ‘Additional fiscal tightening’ – this assumes the Chancellor revises his plans for
departmental spending relative to those set out in March. Specifically, we assume the
Chancellor aims to take £9bn out of departmental spending over a three year period.
Whilst this may sound like a particularly tight settlement, it should be seen within the
context of modelling by the IFS which forecast that Brexit would worsen the UK fiscal
position by somewhere between £23- £38 billion in 2019-2018.
The implications of these scenarios for the evolution of the Scottish Government’s resource block 
grant – prior to any adjustment for devolved taxes – is shown in Chart 2.2. By 2020-21, there is 
around a £700 million real terms difference across the range of scenarios. 
18
 See Emmerson et al. (2016) https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8411 
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Chart 2.2:  Scenarios for the Scottish resource block grant, £m (2016-17 prices) 
 
Source: FAI calculations 
 
2.5 Tax devolution and the block grant adjustments 
The next element in the calculation of Scotland’s budget is the interaction between the block 
grant adjustment mechanism and devolved tax revenues.  
As set out in Box 2.4, by 2016-17 Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (LBTT), Landfill Tax, and 
almost half of revenues from income tax raised in Scotland had been devolved.  
By 2017-18, the setting of rates and bands for Non-Savings, Non-Dividend income tax revenues 
will be fully devolved (although the Personal Allowance will continue to be set at Westminster); Air 
Passenger Duty will be devolved in 2018-19, and a proportion of the receipts from VAT raised in 
Scotland will be assigned to the Scottish budget from 2019-20.  
Box 2.4:  Scotland’s new tax powers 
From 1999 to 2015, the Scottish Government had little in the way of tax autonomy, while 
having responsibility for about 60% of public spending in Scotland.  This was seen as a highly 
asymmetric model of devolution.  
Initially, the only two devolved tax powers were business rates and council tax – raising £1.9 
billion and £2.1 billion (net) respectively in 2015-16.   
Following the Scotland Act 2012, two new devolved taxes were created – Scottish Landfill Tax 
and Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (both from 2015-16) – with the equivalent UK taxes 
switched off. These two new taxes raised £147 million and £425 million respectively in 2015-
16. From 2016-17, a Scottish Rate of Income Tax was established with UK income tax 
reduced by 10 pence across all bands (raising around £4.3 billion in 2015/16).  
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Chart 2.3:  Evolution of Scotland’s tax powers 
Source: GERS and FAI calculations 
Following the Smith Commission, these income tax powers have been extended to cover all 
non-savings and non-dividend income (NSND). Greater flexibility over rates and bands has 
also been granted. Scottish NSND income tax is estimated to raise around £11.2 billion.  
Air Passenger Duty will be devolved in 2018-19, with the existing UK tax currently raising 
around £275 million in Scotland. Aggregates levy is also to be devolved – at a date to be 
agreed by both governments – with the current UK tax raising around £50 million. In time, 
devolved tax revenues will be equivalent to around 30% of total Scottish tax revenues. 
From 2019-20, receipts from the first 10p of the standard VAT rate and the first 2.5p of the 
reduced rate of VAT will be assigned to the Scottish budget – currently around £5 billion for 
2015-16. This will take devolved and assigned revenue as a percentage of Scottish revenue to 
40%. 
After tax devolution, the Scottish block grant will continue to be calculated in the first instance by 
the Barnett formula. But the devolution of tax powers requires this to be adjusted to reflect that 
some of the budget will be replaced by tax revenues.    
For each of the devolved (and assigned) taxes, a ‘block grant adjustment’ (BGA) will be 
calculated. An overview of how the BGAs will be calculated is provided in Box 2.519. 
The key point to bear in mind is that the BGAs can be interpreted as counterfactual estimates of 
the revenues that the UK Government is likely to have foregone – in any given year – as a result 
of transferring each tax to Scotland. The BGA for income tax for example, is an estimate of the 
revenues that the UK Government would have raised from income tax in Scotland, if tax policy 
was the same in Scotland as in the rest of the UK (rUK) and if revenues per capita had grown at 
the same rate in Scotland as in rUK since the tax was devolved. 
19
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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Devolved under Scotland Act 2012
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The way that the BGAs are calculated means that what is critical for the Scottish budget is the 
growth rate of per capita revenues in Scotland relative to the growth rate of per capita revenues 
from the equivalent taxes in rUK.  In short, how does the amount now being taken out – i.e. via 
the BGA – compare to how much is being added back in – i.e. via the new devolved taxes? 
If devolved Scottish revenues turn out to be higher than the BGAs, then the Scottish budget is 
better off than it would have been without tax devolution, and vice versa. 
The fact that what matters here is relative growth in tax revenues has important implications for 
considering the impact of Brexit on the Scottish budget. The decision to leave the EU is expected 
to reduce UK Government tax revenues over the next few years. As a result the BGAs will also 
fall, offsetting any decrease in the Scottish Government’s devolved revenues following any post-
Brexit slowdown in Scotland.  
Box 2.5:  Adjusting the block grant to reflect Scotland’s new tax responsibilities 
The Smith Commission made clear that Scotland’s block grant should continue to be 
determined by the Barnett formula. But it also recognised that Barnett would have to be 
adjusted to reflect the new tax powers.  
To do this, for each of the devolved (and assigned) taxes, a ‘block grant adjustment’ (BGA) will 
be calculated.  
The BGA is calculated for each tax separately, and consists of two elements – an initial 
deduction and an indexation mechanism. 
The initial deduction is simply equal to the tax revenues collected in Scotland in the year 
immediately prior to the devolution of the tax power. For example, if income tax is devolved in 
2017-18, the initial deduction is equal to income tax receipts in Scotland in 2016-17. 
But what should the BGA be in 2017-18 and any year thereafter? This is where the indexation 
mechanism comes in. Its purpose is to provide a measure of the rate at which ‘comparable 
revenues’ have grown in the rest of the UK.   
In negotiating the fiscal framework on which the Scotland Act 2016 financial arrangements 
depended, the Scottish and UK Governments could not agree on the appropriate methodology 
to adopt. This mattered. Depending upon your interpretation, the Scottish budget could have 
lost (or gained) billions of pounds over a relatively short period of time.  
In the end a compromise was reached. The indexation of the BGA will be calculated using two 
methods. The first – preferred by the UK Government – is known as the ‘Comparable Model’. 
The second – preferred by the Scottish Government - is known as ‘Indexed Per Capita’ (IPC). 
However, although the BGAs will be calculated according to both methods, over the period 
until 2020-21 it is the IPC method which will be used. To keep the analysis straightforward, we 
simply calculate Scotland’s BGA according to the IPC approach. 
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The IPC approach assumes that Scottish revenues grow at the same per capita rate as those 
in rUK, and adjusts the BGA accordingly. This is easiest to illustrate with an example – see 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2:  Calculation of the Block Grant Adjustment 
2016-17 2017-18 
Scottish revenues 2016-17: the ‘initial deduction’ £12,175m 
Scottish population 5.38m 5.40m 
Scottish revenues per capita (2016-17) £2,263 
growth rUK revenues per capita (2016-17 & 2017-18) 5.6% 
Assumed Scottish revenues per capita 2017-18 (based on 
rUK growth) 
£2,263 x 105.6% = 
£2,390 
BGA (£m). Scottish revenues per capita multiplied by 
Scottish population in 2017-18 
£2,390 x 5.4m = 
£12,908m 
Let us suppose that the question is what Scotland’s BGA for income tax should be in 2017-18, 
the first year that income tax will be fully devolved. In this hypothetical example, income tax 
revenues from Scotland in 2016-17 (i.e. ‘year 0’, the year immediately prior to devolution) are 
£12.175 billion. So the ‘initial deduction’ is £12.175 billion. 
Between 2016-17 and 2017-18, income tax revenues per capita in rUK grow by 5.6%. This 
means that the initial deduction for income tax (£12.175 billion) is multiplied by 5.6%, and 
multiplied further by the growth in Scottish population – to arrive at a BGA estimate of £12.9 
billion.  
This process continues year on year. 
The implication of the IPC method is that the IPC method protects the Scottish budget from the 
risk that Scotland’s population grows more slowly than the rUK population – what matters is 
growth in tax revenues per capita. The Scottish budget is still exposed to the risk that tax 
revenues per capita grow more slowly than in rUK but also will receive the benefit if they grow 
more quickly. 
Table 2.3 sets out an estimate of the BGAs for each tax over the years from 2015-16 to 2020-21. 
Initial BGAs for 2015-16 and 2016-17 have been set. The Scottish and UK Governments agreed 
a temporary combined BGA for LBTT and Landfill Tax in both 2015-16 and 2016-17 (£494 million 
and £600 million respectively)20. The BGAs for 2016-17 will be reconciled to outturn, and any 
necessary adjustments made to the block grant, when the relevant outturn data becomes 
available.  
20
 Paragraph 36 of the Fourth Annual Report on the implementation and operation of Part 3 (financial provisions) of the Scotland 
Act 2012; http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/03/4517/5  
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In future years, the BGAs for LBTT will be calculated using the IPC indexation method outlined 
above, with the initial deduction based on outturn figures for 2014-15 (not on the agreed BGA in 
2016-17)21. 
The UK and Scottish Governments also agreed a one-off BGA of £4.9 billion in 2016-17 for the 
Scottish Rate of Income Tax – the partial devolution of income tax to be superseded in 2017-18 
by the full devolution of NSND Income Tax. 
For all other taxes (i.e. those to be devolved or assigned in 2017-18 or afterwards), we estimate 
the initial ‘year 0’ block grant deduction based on the OBR’s March 2016 forecasts of the revenue 
raised in Scotland the year before the tax is devolved. We then use OBR forecasts of per capita 
growth in revenues from that tax in rUK to calculate the BGA in future years. 
The total block grant adjustment grows over each year of the forecast period, partly as more 
revenues are transferred to the Scottish Government, and partly due to forecast growth in per 
capita revenues in rUK. Based on the forecasts in the OBR’s March 2016 outlook, by 2020-21 the 
total BGA is forecast at £21 billion. This is the amount deducted from the Barnett-determined 
block grant. 
Table 2.3:  Estimates of the Block Grant Adjustments, £m (cash terms) 
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Combined LBTT/ Landfill Tax 494 600 
SRIT (one-off adjustment) 4,900 
LBTT 642 684 731 777 
Landfill Tax 103 102 104 105 
NSND Income Tax 12,321 12,904 13,393 14,058 
Air Passenger Duty 307 323 339 
VAT 5,754 5,992 
Aggregates Levy 54 54 
Total BGA 494 5,500 13,065 13,997 20,359 21,326 
Source: FAI calculations 
Post-EU referendum, the forecasts for rUK revenues – and therefore the BGAs – will almost 
certainly now be revised down. But if Scottish devolved tax revenues are revised down by a 
similar amount then the net effective will be to cancel one another out.  
To reiterate, whilst the rate of growth in equivalent tax revenues in rUK is crucial for the 
calculation of the BGA, what is critical for the Scottish budget overall is whether or not this growth 
is faster or slower than the growth in Scottish devolved taxes. It is this combination – what is 
taken out from Scotland’s block grant via the BGA versus what is added back in via devolved tax 
revenues – which determines Scotland’s net budget position.  
21
 The outturn figures will be adjusted for forestalling effects, see p.3 of the Fiscal Framework Technical Annex 
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This highlights how crucial it is to assess Scotland’s relative performance. Growth of 5% per 
capita of a devolved tax in Scotland is all well in good, but Scotland would still be worse off if 
growth in the equivalent tax per capita in rUK was 6%.  
Of course the Scottish Government could achieve faster growth in revenues by increasing tax 
rates in Scotland – see Section 2.7.  
But first let’s assume that there are no tax policy changes between Scotland and rUK, and that 
the only thing that can vary is the relative rate of revenue growth. How different might the Scottish 
Government’s budget be? 
Between 2001-02 and 2014-15, Scottish income tax revenues per capita grew at 3.4% per 
annum, compared to 3.2% in the UK as a whole22. Scottish VAT revenues per person also grew 
faster in Scotland than in the UK: 4.7% v. 4.4%. So for our first scenario therefore, we assume 
that Scottish per capita revenue growth continues to maintain this positive differential relative to 
the revenue growth rates for the UK as a whole, not just for income tax, but for all devolved taxes 
and assigned VAT, from the date that they are devolved. 
Our second scenario is the mirror opposite – i.e. Scottish per capita revenues grow more slowly 
(by the same magnitude) than the rate projected for the UK as a whole. 
Table 2.4 summarises the implication of these assumptions. If Scottish per capita revenue growth 
maintains this positive differential relative to rUK, the Scottish budget could be around £130 
million better off by the end of the parliament. In other words, revenues from devolved and 
assigned taxes would be £130 million higher than the BGA for those taxes. If however Scottish 
revenues per capita grow more slowly, the Scottish budget could be £130 million worse off.  
Note that the effects of differential tax revenue growth in this parliament are not as significant as 
they could be in future parliaments. This is because some taxes – notably VAT – will not be 
devolved until 2019-20, and so the length of time over which differential revenue growth can 
occur is relatively limited. 
Table 2.4:  The effects of faster or slower relative per capita tax revenue growth on the Scottish 
budget, £m (cash terms) 
  2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Faster Scottish growth 25 51 90 132 
Slower Scottish growth -24 -50 -88 -130 
Source:  FAI calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Source: Government Expenditure and Revenues Scotland, 2015-16 
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2.6 Bringing this all together – the outlook for the Scottish Budget 
It is now possible to bring together the determinants of the Scottish resource budget – the block 
grant, the BGA and devolved revenues – to set out the estimated level of resource that the 
Scottish Government will have access to over the period to 2020-21.  
The purpose of this analysis is to set out a range of scenarios rather than one central scenario. In 
Section 2.7, we consider the scope for variation in Scottish tax policy. 
We consider the four scenarios for the evolution of the Scottish block grant described in Section 
2.4. 
For each of these block grant scenarios, we overlap the two scenarios – set out in Section 2.5 – 
for relative growth of Scottish revenues: the optimistic scenario, where Scottish per capita 
revenues grow relatively faster than those in rUK, and the pessimistic scenario, where the 
reverse happens. 
For comparative purposes, we also show the evolution of the Scottish budget under the March 
2016 UK Budget spending plans assuming Scottish and rUK tax growth is identical.   
Under this scenario with the block grant as set out in March, and identical revenue growth in 
Scotland as rUK, the Scottish budget could be expected to fall by around £900 million in real 
terms, or 3.6%, by 2020-21 (Table 2.5). 
Our alternative scenarios, which vary assumptions about the Scottish block grant and the growth 
of relative tax revenues, lie around that range. 
Even a relatively optimistic scenario – one where Scotland outperforms the UK and the UK 
Government increases its resource spending plans compared to those set out in March – is still 
projected to lead to a real terms cut in the Scottish budget of around 2.8% or £700 million.  
For other outcomes the range of cuts is around 3% to 4%, although under the most pessimistic 
scenario the Scottish budget may face cuts of up to 6.2% - or up to around £1.6 billion – over the 
course of this parliament.  
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Table 2.5:  Scenarios for the outlook of the Scottish budget, £m (2016-17 prices) 
2016-17 
£million 
2020-21 
£million 
Change 
16-17 to 
20-21 
Annual 
change 16-
17 to 20-21 
March spending plans (same revenue growth 
as rUK) 26,115 25,178 -3.6% -0.9% 
March spending plans (faster revenue 
growth) 26,115 25,300 -3.1% -0.8% 
March spending plans (slower revenue 
growth) 26,115 25,058 -4.0% -1.0% 
Additional fiscal consolidation (faster revenue 
growth) 26,115 24,734 -5.3% -1.3% 
Additional fiscal consolidation (slower 
revenue growth) 26,115 24,492 -6.2% -1.6% 
Spending stimulus (faster revenue growth) 26,115 25,394 -2.8% -0.7% 
Spending stimulus (slower revenue growth) 26,115 25,152 -3.7% -0.9% 
Extended consolidation (faster revenue 
growth) 26,115 24,930 -4.5% -1.2% 
Extended consolidation (slower revenue 
growth) 26,115 24,688 -5.5% -1.4% 
Source: FAI calculations 
This range of outcomes may seem – at first glance – to be relatively large (Chart 2.4). However, 
each scenario contains plausible outcomes and it is their combination which determines the 
overall range. For example, a scenario where the UK Government presses ahead with 
consolidation and Scotland was to grow more slowly than the rest of the UK would imply a 
relatively sharp real-terms fall in the Scottish budget. 
In contrast, if Scotland was to outperform the UK and the UK Government was to ease the pace 
of consolidation, then Scotland’s budget would perform better. However, it should be noted that 
even on this scenario, the Scottish budget is still projected to fall in real-terms - marking a full 
decade of cuts.  
Coupled with the spending commitments and pressures we set out in Chapter 3, it is clear that 
the Scottish budget faces a period of significant ongoing constraint.  
What this suggests is that the Scottish Government needs to plan for a range of possible 
scenarios from 2017-18 onwards. It does not have the discretion that the UK has of increasing 
borrowing to manage spending pressures – effectively it has to run a balanced budget based on 
the block grant, BGAs, and tax revenues. Crucially, the Scottish Government will need to work on 
contingency plans should the pressure on budgets intensify.  
Up until now we have assumed that Scottish tax policy does not diverge from UK policy. But 
devolved tax revenues might not only grow faster or slower as a result of differential tax growth – 
the Scottish Government may also vary its budget by making explicit tax policy choices.  
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Chart 2.4:  Scenarios for the Scottish resource budget, £m (real terms, 2016-17 prices) 
Source: FAI calculations 
2.7 Tax policy commitments 
In what follows, we assume that the tax policies set out in the SNP 2016 manifesto become 
Scottish Government commitments.  
The Scottish Government has two headline policy positions on income tax - 
x Increase the Personal Allowance to £12,750 by the end of the parliament.
x Freeze the Higher Rate threshold in 2017-18 and ensure that it will rise by a maximum of
inflation until 2021-22.
It is also committed to halve the burden of Air Passenger Duty by the end of the parliament23. 
We consider the revenue implications of each of these policies below. 
Increase the Income Tax Personal Allowance to £12,750 
Although the ability to vary the Income Tax Personal Allowance is not devolved, the Scottish 
Government can effectively set a higher Personal Allowance by setting a zero rate on top of the 
UK allowance.  
23
 In relation to Scottish Government spending commitments, by the ‘end of this parliament’, we generally mean 2021-22. The 
parliament will technically ‘end’ in Spring 2021, but the budget for the 2021-22 financial year will be set in this parliamentary 
term. We similarly assume that tax commitments to be achieved ‘by the end of the parliament’ are to be achieved in full by 
2021-22. 
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Above inflation increases in the Personal Allowance represent tax cuts, as they increase the 
amount of income that is not subject to tax. How much of a tax cut a rise in the Personal 
Allowance to £12,750 represents depends on the timescale over which it is implemented. 
The UK Government has set out an intention to raise the Personal Allowance to £12,500 by the 
end of the UK parliament. Whilst the interpretation of ‘end of’ is open to debate, we take it as 
2020-21.  
The Scottish Government aspiration is to raise the Personal Allowance to £12,750 by the end of 
the Scottish parliamentary term which instead relates to 2021-22. An increase in the Personal 
Allowance from £12,500 in 2020-21 to £12,750 in 2021-22 is equivalent to a 2% increase – i.e. in 
line with inflation and, more than likely, what will happen at the UK level anyway.  
The Scottish Government policy might be seen as little more than indexing the Personal 
Allowance to inflation. If the UK follows suit, the policy will be revenue neutral. 
To date however, the UK Government has only legislated to increase the Personal Allowance to 
£11,500 in 2017-18, and then to index it to inflation from then on. This implies (based on current 
inflation forecasts), that the UK Personal Allowance will reach £12,000 in 2019-20 and £12,200 in 
2020-21.  
In making its forecasts, the OBR is mandated to reflect actual government policy (not intentions 
or ambitions). Manifesto ‘commitments’ that have not yet been legislated for are noted as a 
source of risk but are not explicitly incorporated into the forecasts.  Therefore, consistent with the 
approach taken by the OBR – with analysis based on current legislation rather than political 
aspiration – it is these forecasts which underpin our estimates of the income tax BGA in Table 
2.3. 
The revenue impact of the Scottish Government setting a Personal Allowance of £12,750, relative 
to one of £12,200 (which currently underpins OBR tax forecasts) would be fairly substantial. 
Based on our modelling, we estimate that this would cost around £225 million by 2021-22.  
However, our projections only run until 2020-21, and we thus exclude this policy commitment 
from our analysis24. 
Freeze the Income Tax Higher Rate threshold in 2017-18 and raise it by inflation thereafter 
The second income tax commitment of the Scottish Government is to freeze the Higher Rate 
threshold in 2017-18 and ensure that it rises by no more than inflation until 2021-22.  
This policy has been expressed as a revenue raising policy, on the basis that the UK Government 
has committed to increase the Higher Rate threshold by faster than inflation, from £43,000 in 
2016-17 to £50,000 by the end of the UK parliament25.  
But how much additional revenue will the policy raise relative to the estimates in Table 2.5? 
24
 If the Scottish Government decided to achieve a graduated increase in the Personal Allowance to £12,750 in 2021/22, then 
relative to a Personal Allowance that was indexed to inflation, this would cost the Scottish budget around £36m, £76m, and 
£113m respectively in 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. 
25
 See http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Income-tax-rates-to-be-frozen-2479.aspx 
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This again depends critically on the assumptions and baseline used. As above, the forecasts in 
Table 2.5 were based on the assumption that Scottish income tax policy mirrors policy legislated 
for in the UK, not the Conservative manifesto.  
The March 2016 UK Budget set out provisions for the Higher Rate threshold to rise to £45,000 in 
2017-18. Beyond this however, the current legislation is for the Higher Rate threshold to rise by 
inflation. Given forecasts for inflation at that time26 this implies a Higher Rate threshold of 
£48,000 (not the £50,000 in the Conservative manifesto) in 2020-21.  
This gives two possible scenarios. 
Firstly, if the Scottish Government freezes the Higher Rate threshold at £43,387 in 2017-18, for it 
to then increase according to CPI inflation, the Higher Rate threshold in Scotland would reach 
£46,000 by 2020-21. This lower threshold – compared to the UK rate of £48,000 – would 
according to our modelling raise around an additional £176 million27. 
Secondly, if the UK Government delivered on the Conservative manifesto commitment to raise 
the Higher Rate threshold to £50,000 by 2020-21, this would have the added effect of reducing 
UK income tax revenues, and therefore the BGA for Scotland (fifth row of Table 2.6). This would 
cut the BGA by around £194 million by 2020-21.  
In summary by 2020-21, if the Scottish Government implements the SNP manifesto pledge, it will 
raise around £180 million annually in tax, whilst if the UK Government implements the 
Conservative manifesto pledge, the Scottish BGA will fall by around £190 million in 2020-21, 
relative to the estimate shown in Table 2.3 above. 
Table 2.6:  Scenarios for the Higher Rate threshold, £m (cash terms) – revenue impacts 
2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
UK Higher Rate threshold (Budget 2016) £45,000 £45,945 £46,864 £47,801 
Scottish Higher Rate threshold (manifesto 
commitment) £43,387 £44,298 £45,184 £46,088 
Additional Scottish revenues as a result of these 
thresholds (£million) £130 £160 £166 £176 
UK Higher Rate threshold (manifesto commitment) £45,000 £46,667 £48,333 £50,000 
Reduction in BGA as a result of these thresholds 
(£million) £0 -£60 -£124 -£194 
Total Revenue Gain (£million) £130 £220 £290 £370 
Source: FAI calculations 
The net impact of UK Government and SNP Manifesto Commitments would be to boost the 
Scottish budget by around £370 million annually by 2020-21.  
26
 Table 4.1 of the March 2016 Economic and Fiscal Outlook.  
27
 Our modelling takes no account of potential behavioural effects and therefore can be viewed as an upper estimate. 
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Reduce Air Passenger Duty 
The Draft Budget 2016-17 confirmed that the Scottish Government intends to reduce APD by 
50%, with the reduction beginning in April 2018 and delivered in full by the end of the parliament. 
The costs of this policy will depend on the extent to which the tax cut stimulates greater 
passenger numbers. In the absence of any full economic modelling of this policy by the Scottish 
Government however, we assume that a halving of the tax burden will equate to a revenue fall of 
50%, which we phase in between 2018-19 and 2021-22. This policy costs the Scottish 
Government £m, £m and £m in 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21 respectively (Table 
2.7). 
Table 2.7:  Air Passenger Duty, £m (cash terms) – revenue impacts 
2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
APD forecast 'no policy change' - 307 323 339 
APD revenues, SNP manifesto 
Commitment - 268 242 212 
Revenue Cost - -38 -81 -127 
Source: FAI calculations 
Reduce waste to landfill 
The Scottish Government has set an ambition to reduce total waste generated to 85% of the 
2011 level by 2025, and to reduce total disposals to landfill to 5% of total waste generated. 
Although not a tax policy per se, if the target is achieved it will result in a reduction in the tax 
base.  
The Scottish Government’s forecasts for Landfill Tax take account the revenue costs of meeting 
the policy objective. Relative to the baseline scenario, the policy is expected to result in Scottish 
revenues being lower by £6m, £18m and £30m in 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2020-21 respectively. 
Of course, if similar reductions in waste to landfill were made in rUK, and these reduced Landfill 
Tax receipts in rUK, then the effect of lower tax revenues in Scotland might be offset by a lower 
block grant adjustment. 
Summary of tax policy commitments 
The combined revenue effects of the Scottish policy measures (including the effect of an increase 
in the UK Higher Rate threshold on the Scottish block grant) are shown in Table 2.8.  
If all commitments are followed through, and if the Scottish Government is successful in reducing 
levels of waste to landfill, the aggregate effect of these tax measures is to raise the Scottish 
budget by £130 million in 2017-18, rising to around £213 million in 2020-21. 
In the context of the scenarios outlined in Table 2.5 – which showed the Scottish budget varying 
between £24.5 billion and £25.3 billion depending on assumptions about UK fiscal policy and 
relative Scottish tax revenue growth – the revenue implication of existing tax policy proposals is 
marginal. Revenues of £213 million equate to less than 1% of the Scottish resource budget.  
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Table 2.8:   Revenue effects of Scottish tax policy measures, £m 
2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Scottish Higher Rate: freeze then CPI index £130 £160 £166 £176 
UK Higher Rate: increase to £50k £60 £124 £194 
Reduce APD  - -38 -81 -127 
Reduce waste to landfill -6 -18 -30 
Net effect £130 £176 £191 £213 
 Source: FAI calculations 
Note:  (+ = revenue raising; - = revenue cut) 
2.8 The outlook for capital spending 
The final piece of the jigsaw is the outlook for capital spending. Under the new fiscal framework, 
the decision to devolve tax powers and the complex arrangements for adjusting the block grant 
will not apply to capital spending. The Scottish Government will still largely just receive a grant for 
capital spending from the UK Government.  
The Scottish Government’s capital grant is expected to be £2. billion in 2016-17 (excluding 
Financial Transactions). The March 2016 UK Budget forecast that this would increase to £3.3 
billion by 2020-21 (Table 2.9).  
There is a possibility that the Chancellor may announce a boost to capital spending in his Autumn 
Statement. The implications for Scotland will depend upon the extent to which spending is 
targeted at areas with high Barnett consequentials. Roughly speaking, a 10% increase in UK 
capital spending that is comparable in terms of the Barnett formula equates to £300 million.  
Table 2.9:  The Scottish Government’s Capital Grant and Capital Borrowing Limits, £m 
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
cDEL block grant 2,692 2,846 2,908 3,038 3,202 3,300 
cDEL block grant (real) 2,733 2,846 2,856 2,923 3,024 3,055 
Capital borrowing limits (Scotland 
Act 2012) 306 316 
Capital borrowing limits (Scotland 
Act 2016) 450 450 450 450 
Total 2,998 3,162 3,358 3,488 3,652 3,750 
Source: FAI calculations 
One new addition in the fiscal framework is the power to borrow for additional expenditure 
beyond this cDEL allocation.  
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The Scottish Government is now able to invest an additional £450 million by borrowing from the 
National Loans Fund or the private sector (loans or bonds28).  
The Scottish Government has announced a further £100 million of capital investment in 2016-17. 
This is largely un-spent resource monies from 2015-16 being drawn down this financial year.  
 
2.9 Conclusions 
The end of fiscal consolidation is by no means in sight, with further real terms reductions likely 
over the course of this parliament. A decade of cuts is now a distinct possibility.  
Real-terms cuts had already been planned prior to the EU referendum. The decision to leave the 
EU has made the outlook a little more uncertain.  That being said, we can still make important 
judgements about the likely path of the Scottish budget under a range of plausible scenarios.  
Firstly, it is unlikely that the UK Government will depart from its policy of tackling the fiscal deficit 
in the medium term. Whilst there might be a modest stimulus in the short-term – perhaps to 
investment and/or cut in taxation – a substantial increase in day-to-day public spending appears 
unlikely.  
Secondly, under the new fiscal framework what is crucial is how well the Scottish economy copes 
with Brexit relative to the rest of the UK. The new Block Grant Adjustment (BGA) mechanism will 
cut the Scottish budget each year by the growth in comparable tax revenues in rUK. If Scottish 
devolved tax revenues per head can grow more quickly, then this will more than offset the BGA - 
Scotland will be better off compared to Barnett. But if they grow more slowly, Scotland will be 
worse off.  
We have set out a range of possible outcomes. In short, which ever scenario is r, the Scottish 
budget will remain highly constrained. Even under a relatively optimistic scenario where Scotland 
outperforms rUK and the UK Government implements an increase in departmental spending 
relative to its March plans, the Scottish budget is still likely to be lower in 2020-21 than in 2016-17 
– a cut of around 2.8% in real terms. Under a scenario where the UK Government loosens fiscal 
policy through tax cuts rather than spending increases, and retains a medium term focus on 
reducing the deficit, the Scottish budget is likely to fall by 3-4% in real terms.  
On more challenging scenarios, for example where the UK Government continues with its aim of 
tackling the deficit – albeit over a longer time horizon – and Scotland underperforms relative to 
the rest of the UK, the decline in the Budget could be larger – a cut of nearly 6.2%.  
The Scottish Government now has of course the opportunity to raise revenues through devolved 
tax rates. To date, the policies announced will collectively only have a marginal impact on 
revenue, making a less than 1% difference to the Scottish Government’s resource budget.   
As we outline in the next chapter, this outlook will mean that the government will have to carefully 
prioritise their commitments over the course of the parliament.   
                                                          
28
 Clearly, any borrowing must be repaid. Borrowing for capital spending today thus implies a spending commitment on the 
Scottish Government’s future resource spending. We consider spending commitments in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Spending 
commitments and constraints 
 
x The Scottish Government has set out a number of high profile spending priorities for the 
new parliament.  
 
x It plans to increase health spending by £500m more than inflation by the end of the 
parliament. It has also committed to maintain real terms spending on policing and has a 
flagship policy to double the provision of free childcare. 
 
x Delivering these commitments will require a serious re-prioritisation of spend. In the context 
of a declining resource budget, some unprotected areas of the budget could face cuts of 
between 10% to 17% (2.6% to 4.5% annually) over the period to 2020-21, depending on 
scenarios for the Scottish block grant and relative growth of Scotland’s new tax revenues. 
 
x Alongside these high profile commitments, the Scottish Government has outlined a number 
of additional costly policies. These include protecting further education places, and free 
higher education tuition.  
 
x The Scottish budget also faces a number of spending risks – 
 
o Inflation is anticipated to increase in the near-term, reducing the real terms value of 
budgets whilst making spending commitments expressed in real terms more 
expensive;  
 
o It is forecast that the Scottish Government will spend around £1.2 billion each year 
over the course of this parliament on PFI/NPD repayments; 
 
o The public sector payroll accounts for around 55% of the Scottish budget and after 
years of pay freezes and below inflation increases, the pressure for more generous 
awards is likely to increase; and,  
 
o The delivery of Scotland’s new welfare powers will be a major priority. The cost of 
delivering the new system could be much higher than the £200 million secured from 
HM Treasury to cover the administration costs for all new powers.  
 
x Local government faced a particularly challenging settlement in 2016-17, with its revenue 
grant cut by 5% in real terms. At the same time, an increasing number of conditions have 
been attached to budget allocations, opening up a wider debate around the future of local 
government. As an area of ‘unprotected spend’, the grant to local government could be cut 
by around £1 billion on a like-for-like basis by 2020-21 – with increases in business rate 
and council tax income only partially offsetting these cuts.  
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The Scottish Government will set out a series of spending commitments for the 
new parliamentary term in its Budget to be published later this year. In a time 
of tight resources, this will imply a tough re-prioritisation of spend with some 
portfolios facing substantial real terms reductions over the course of this 
parliament. Following six years of austerity this will not be easy, with some 
portfolios facing the prospect of a decade of real-terms cuts. Unprotected 
portfolios could face cuts of between 10% and 17% by 2020-21.   
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered how the Scottish Government’s budget might evolve over the 
course of the new parliament.  
How might it decide to distribute this budget across a multitude of spending priorities? This is the 
question we consider in this chapter.  
In the previous parliament, the Scottish Government had to take a series of difficult decisions 
about how to distribute resources across portfolios. To help support this, they embarked upon a 
programme of public service reform - most recently the integration of health and social care – 
coupled with efficiency targets and restraint in public sector pay.  
Resource spending on health was increased in real terms. But other budgets faced substantial 
cuts. In particular, whilst insulated somewhat – at least initially – from the scale of cuts in 
England, Scottish local authorities have still seen their block grant fall by around 11% in real 
terms between 2010-11 and 2016-1729.  
Within portfolios there have also been significant cutbacks. For example, Scotland’s enterprise 
budgets have fallen by over 20%30 in real terms since 2009-10.   
As Chapter 2 made clear, the balance of probability is that the Scottish Government’s budget is 
likely to remain at least as constrained over the course of this parliament even after the 
devolution of new tax powers.  
The Scottish Government will need to decide how to allocate these scarce resources to their 
immediate policy – and political – commitments as well as their longer-term aspirations set out in 
the National Performance Framework31.  
The SNP’s 2016 manifesto provides some indication as to where priorities lie. 
                                                          
29
 Source: http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/report/an-overview-of-local-government-in-scotland-2016   
30
 See Annex H of Draft Scottish Budget 2017-17 
31
 See http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/purposestratobjs   
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A number of key spending pledges have been set out including increases in the Health budget – 
totalling over 3% in real terms by 2020-21. With inflation expected to rise, the cost of delivering 
such commitments will increase.  
At the same time, the government will also face a number of constraints that will limit the degree 
of flexibility, including repayment costs on Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Non-Profit 
Distribution (NPD) schemes, increased demand for public services from an ageing population, 
and pressure on the public sector pay bill after years of restraint.   
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the core spending pledges 
outlined so far by the Scottish Government and consider the implications for the distribution of the 
budget.  
In Section 3.3, we extend this discussion to include a broader set of policy commitments, before 
Section 3.4 discusses the spending outlook for the ‘non-protected’ areas. 
It is important however, to view the discussion of policy priorities and the corresponding cuts in 
the round. Health accounts for around 44% of the Scottish budget in 2016-17 and it follows that 
any prioritisation of the health budget will have serious implications for other portfolios. Critics of 
cuts in particular portfolios will need to set out where money should be saved or what taxes 
should rise. 
Section 3.5 focuses on the capital outlook.  
Our analysis leads us to conclude that irrespective of the particular scenario adopted, and given 
the commitments and constraints we outline, a central focus of the debate in the coming months 
will be the settlement for local government and the potential implications of around a £1 billion cut 
to local authority resource funding on a like-for-like basis. This is the focus of Section 3.6. Section 
3.7 concludes.    
  
3.2 Explicit spending commitments 
The Scottish Government has set out a number of high profile spending commitments for the new 
parliament. As in Chapter 2, we take the view that commitments contained in the 2016 SNP 
manifesto are now Scottish Government priorities.   
Three of the most significant are expressed explicitly in funding terms. In our view, we see these 
as totemic policy priorities for the Scottish Government, both in terms of scale and political profile.  
These three relate to health, policing, and the expansion of childcare. 
Health spending 
Since 2007, the Scottish Government has prioritised health spending. It is clear that this will 
continue.  
The SNP Manifesto set out a pledge to increase the NHS revenue budget by £500 million more 
than inflation by the end of the parliament. This commitment implies an increase in the health 
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resource budget from £12.4 billion in 2016-17 to £14.1 billion by 2021-22, equivalent to a 3.7% 
real terms funding increase.  
Exact profiling of this investment has yet to be set out. For simplicity, we assume that the 
increase is phased equally over our forecast period, so that health spending reaches £13.8 billion 
(a 3.1% real terms increase) by 2020-2132. 
Box 3.1 puts the health spending commitment in some context. 
Box 3.1: Health spending pressures 
Spending on health has been rising in real terms since 1999. Resource spending on health 
rose from 38% of the Scottish Government’s RDEL in 1999-2000 to 44% in 2014-15 (Chart 
3.1). 
Chart 3.1:  Health spend as a percentage of Scottish resource spending  
 
Source: Public expenditure statistical analysis, various years 
This increase has – in contrast to other areas of the public sector – led to an expansion in the 
numbers employed in the NHS. In Jan-Mar 2016, there were 161,700 people employed by 
NHS Scotland, up from 147,500 over the same period in 2006 – a rise of nearly 10%.  
The Scottish Government has made clear that it will continue to invest in the health resource 
budget in real-terms. A series of new capital investments will also be undertaken, including six 
new diagnostic treatment centres costing around £200 million.  
However, with a continuation of increasing demand expected, the pressure on health services 
will continue to rise. Despite increased budgets, key challenges have emerged including in 
A&E Waiting Times and delayed discharges.  In response, and alongside new investment the 
                                                          
32
 The commitment ‘by the end of this parliament’ in our view means 2021-22, which is the last Budget to be set in this 
parliamentary session (with elections May 2021). By NHS we mean all health spending – and not just territorial and Special 
NHS Boards. This commitment results in additional health spending of £1.8 billion by 2021-22, which is broadly consistent with 
the Scottish Government’s figure of ‘around £2 billion’.  
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government has embarked on a series of reforms as it aims to focus on prevention and 
delivery of more home-based care.   
This will not be easy. The health budget faces a number of unique spending pressures with 
demand for healthcare increasing over time and at a faster rate than other public services.   
One reason for this is demographics. Scotland’s population is ageing. Between 1999 and 2014, 
the proportion of Scotland’s population aged over 65 increased from 15.7% to 18.3%. By the 
end of this parliament, this will have reached almost 20%, according to ONS Principal 
population projections. 
Older populations tend to demand more healthcare. Chart 3.2 below shows the implied NHS 
costs per person and year of age in Scotland33. If the ratio of health care costs to age remains 
the same, then based on demographic projections we forecast that the Scottish health budget 
would need to rise by 2.3% in real terms by 2020-21 simply to keep up with demographic 
change34. This puts the projected real terms increase in the Scottish health budget of 3.1% 
over the same period in context. 
Chart 3.2:  Per capita health costs, by gender and age 
 
Source: Derived from NHS Scotland Resource Allocation Formula 
The health service also faces rising costs as a result of high-cost drugs and new technologies.  
One factor that has eased the burden has been that pay increases have been modest. 
However, continuing public sector restraint alongside private sector pay acceleration will make 
it difficult to recruit and retain high quality motivated workers.  
                                                          
33
 These costs are derived from the NHS Scotland Resource Allocation Formula, which estimated age-cost profiles in 2007. See 
http://www.isdscotland.org/Health-Topics/Finance/Resource-Allocation-Formula/  
34
 There is however a debate as to whether what matters in determining health costs is not age, but time to death. In other 
words, an ageing population might not necessarily imply additional health expenditure, if the majority of health expenditures are 
demanded in the last few years of life, rather than being associated with a specific age. 
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Police spending 
Since 2007, the Scottish Government has delivered a commitment to support 1,000 extra police 
officers. The government has argued that this has been an important factor behind a fall in 
recorded crime, which is now at a 41-year low. The sustainability of the commitment has 
however, been questioned by the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) and trade unions.  
The Scottish Government appears to have moved away from this policy beyond 2016-17. It now 
intends to give Police Scotland the “flexibility to be able to adapt the numbers to reflect the 
changing nature of crime”35 with the recognition that other skills may be required to cope with 
new pressures including cybercrime and heightened terrorist threats.  
The transition from eight regional police forces to Police Scotland has not been without its 
challenges. Audit Scotland has been critical of the lack of a long-term financial strategy. A report 
in December 2015, estimated that the force could face a funding gap of around £85 million by 
2018-19 based upon current plans36.   
In part due to the pressures on Police Scotland budgets, the Scottish Government has committed 
to protect the police resource budget in real terms over the course of the new parliament. This 
implies an increase in funding for the Scottish Police Authority from £1.07 billion in 2016-17 to 
£1.16 billion in 2020-2137.  
Childcare 
The Scottish Government has committed to doubling the number of hours of free early years 
education and childcare to 30 hours a week for vulnerable 2 year olds and all 3 and 4 year olds 
by 2021. It is estimated that this will include 600 new childcare centres and require 20,000 more 
qualified staff. 
According to the SNP manifesto, this policy will cost an additional £500 million per year by the 
end of the parliament (from £439m in 2015-16 to £939m in 2020-21).  
The government has yet to set out the detail of how this commitment will be delivered. A number 
of different approaches are to be piloted with a view to rolling out best practice, particularly in 
terms of quality and flexibility. 
It is anticipated that the expansion will be delivered by local authorities, and as such the Scottish 
Government will negotiate with COSLA how much additional funding will be transferred to the 
local government revenue grant. Some council leaders have, however, expressed doubts over 
whether or not the new investment can be delivered within planned timescales citing staff and 
accommodation shortages.   
                                                          
35
 See - www.holyrood.com/articles/news/snp-drops-1000-extra-police-officers-target-party-promises-give-police-scotland  
36
 See - www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/news/auditor-general-reports-for-a-second-time-on-issues-with-scottish-police-authority-
accounts  
37
 Page 71 – Scottish Draft Budget 2016-17.  
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The Scottish Government may choose a different delivery mechanism, including passing the 
funding directly to parents (e.g. vouchers). Irrespective of the mechanism, from a public finance 
perspective this is a new commitment that will require resource.  
Cost of the commitments 
Taken together, these three policy initiatives represent a significant financial investment by the 
Scottish Government. The upper part of Table 3.1 shows the implications of these commitments 
for spending on health, police and childcare by 2020-21. Taken together, spending on these three 
areas will increase by £1.9 billion over the period to 2020-21.  
We have followed Scottish Government practice of expressing spending plans and commitments 
at a portfolio level to include ‘non-cash’ DEL38.  
Table 3.1:  Spending commitments and implications for the Scottish Government resource 
budget: 2016-17 prices 
  
Expenditure 
in 2020-21 
(£m) 
Change, 
2016-17-
2020-21 
Annualised 
change, 
2016-17-
2020-21 
Spending on commitments    
NHS - spend £500m more than inflation by end of parliament £12,767 3.1% 0.8% 
Police Scotland - protect in real terms £1,070 0.0% 0.0% 
Childcare - double provision £869 58.3% 12.2% 
Total spend on committed areas £14,706 5.0% 1.2% 
Remainder for unprotected portfolios     
March spending plan (same revenue growth) 11,622 -11.6% -3.0% 
March spending plan (faster revenue growth) 11,744 -10.6% -2.8% 
March spending plan (slower revenue growth) 11,502 -12.5% -3.3% 
Additional fiscal consolidation (faster revenue growth) 11,178 -14.9% -4.0% 
Additional fiscal consolidation (slower revenue growth) 10,936 -16.8% -4.5% 
Spending stimulus (faster revenue growth) 11,839 -9.9% -2.6% 
Spending stimulus (slower revenue growth) 11,596 -11.8% -3.1% 
Extended consolidation (faster revenue growth) 11,374 -13.5% -3.5% 
Extended consolidation (slower revenue growth) 11,132 -15.3% -4.1% 
Source: FAI calculations 
Delivering these commitments in a time of overall resource constraint will require substantial re-
prioritisation within other portfolios.   
Table 3.1 sets out the implications of these spending commitments in real terms for unprotected 
portfolios, under a variety of budget scenarios. The scenarios in Table 3.1 build on those outlined 
in Chapter 2. There are four scenarios for the Scottish block grant; for each of these block grant 
                                                          
38
 ‘Non-cash’ DEL covers depreciation and impairments and does not represent actual spending power. Non-cash DEL 
accounts for just over £1 billion in the 2016-17 Draft Budget. Consistent with that publication, we assume that Non-cash DEL 
remains constant over the Spending Review period.  
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scenarios we then consider the implication for the Scottish budget if devolved revenues grow 
relatively faster or slower than the comparable rUK revenues. All scenarios further assume that 
the Scottish and UK Governments implement their respective tax policy commitments, and this – 
as described in Chapter 2 – raises the Scottish budget by around £200m in 2020-21, relative to a 
‘no policy change’ scenario.  
Deducting the expected costs of the policy commitments outlined above provides an illustration of 
the scale of the re-prioritisation from ‘unprotected’ areas of the budget. 
Under the budget plans laid out by George Osborne in the March Budget, and assuming that 
Scottish devolved revenues grow at the same rate as those in rUK, the implication of these three 
spending commitments is that the Scottish Government’s resource budget for all other portfolios 
would fall by 11.6% in real terms by 2020-21. 
Even under a more optimistic scenario where the UK Government increases departmental 
spending relative to its March plans, and where devolved revenues grow relatively faster than the 
equivalent revenues in rUK, unprotected portfolios could see their budgets fall by almost 10% in 
real terms. 
Under a pessimistic scenario, where the UK Government undertakes further fiscal consolidation 
and Scottish devolved revenues grow relatively more slowly, the budget for unprotected areas 
could fall by up to 16.8%. 
In line with the discussion in Chapter 2, we expect fiscal prudence and consolidation to remain as 
the underpinning principles of UK fiscal policy in the medium term, even if there is some fiscal 
loosening in the short-term to counter any post-EU referendum slowdown. In the remainder of this 
chapter therefore, we focus on the ‘extended consolidation’ scenario. Under this scenario for the 
block grant, unprotected portfolios could see cuts in their resource budgets of between 13.5% 
and 15.3%, depending on whether the growth of Scottish devolved revenues is faster or slower 
than the growth of equivalent revenues in rUK. 
Clearly, these cuts are unlikely to be distributed evenly across unprotected areas and services 
but the average cut is clearly substantial.  
Delivering cuts of this scale will be a significant challenge. To put this in context, a cut of 13.5% to 
the unprotected areas of the Scottish budget is equivalent to around £1.8 billion in real terms. 
This is more than the Scottish Government’s entire spending in Rural Affairs, Food and 
Environment, Finance, Constitution and Economy, Fair Work, Skills and Training, and Culture, 
Europe and External Affairs portfolios (Chart 3.3).   
An added challenge is that some of these areas of ‘unprotected’ spend have borne a significant 
share of the burden of fiscal consolidation since 2010-11. One might reasonably assume that any 
cuts that were easy to identify and deliver have already been made, so any further cuts may be 
harder to make.  
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Chart 3.3:  Scale of the challenge - £1.8 billion in context, by portfolio spend 2016-17 
 
Source: Scottish Government draft budget 2016-17 
 
3.3 Additional policy priorities 
Alongside the explicit high profile spending commitments set out above, the Scottish Government 
has outlined a number of additional policy pledges. Some are not necessarily expressed in 
funding terms as yet, but will clearly carry a significant price tag. It will thus be up to the 
government to determine how to allocate the budget in order to meet these policy pledges.  
Further & higher education funding 
The Scottish Government has committed to maintaining the number of college FTE places at 
116,000 per annum.  
Conservatively, it might be assumed that this implies (at the very least) maintenance of 2016-17 
cash-terms resource spending on college services. Even if delivered, this would be equivalent to 
a 7% real terms fall between 2016-17 and 2020-21. 
On university funding, the outlook is more uncertain. In the 2016-17 Draft Budget, the Scottish 
Government pledged to continue with funding in excess of £1 billion but only for that year. 
Beyond that, the government indicated that they will “seek to ensure that over the period of the 
spending review to 2019-20, the allocation for higher education from the Scottish Government’s 
budget will support the continued success of our world-class, research-excellent and 
internationally competitive universities”39. Given the resource constraints outlined above real-
terms reductions in funding seem likely.  
The commitment to free higher education tuition, at a cost of some £300 million per year, is 
retained. In addition, the Scottish Government has pledged to boost the number of students from 
Scotland’s most disadvantaged backgrounds.  
                                                          
39
 Page 50, 2016-17 Scottish Government Draft Budget.  
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Educational attainment 
The Scottish Government has made improving Scotland’s attainment record in education – both 
in terms of overall performance and closing the gap between those from the poorest and most 
affluent backgrounds – a key objective.  
To support this, it has earmarked a total of £750 million through the Scottish Attainment Fund. 
Each year, approximately £100 million will be allocated directly to schools, on the basis of the 
numbers of children who meet the eligibility criteria for free school meals, financed from the 
planned reforms to Council Tax (see below). £50 million will be allocated from within existing 
budgets through the Challenge Authorities.   
In addition to this, it seems likely that the Scottish Government will be under pressure to find 
some mechanism to maintain – at least in some form – the overall level of investment in school 
education outside of these attainment commitments (e.g. to maintain teacher numbers). This is 
likely to be particularly important as new initiatives such as the new National Improvement 
Framework are implemented. All of this will require negotiation with COSLA.   
Concessionary travel 
The Scottish Government has made a strong case for its concessionary travel policy. This policy 
cost £208 million in 2016-17. In the Programme for Government they announced that they will 
“examine with stakeholders options to safeguard the longer-term sustainability of the 
concessionary travel scheme”.  
It might be reasonable to assume that spending on the existing concessionary travel scheme will 
increase in line with inflation, (this is a fairly conservative assumption, given the projected growth 
in the over-60 population). 
The Scottish Government will also implement a new scheme to provide free bus travel to all 
young people under 21 who are undertaking an apprenticeship. 
Welfare spending 
It is also reasonable to assume that the Scottish Government will continue the 2016-17 cash 
terms allocations – at the very least – to the Scottish Welfare Fund (£38 million in 2016-17) and 
that mitigating the effects of the ‘bedroom tax’ (£35 million per year currently), will rise with 
inflation.  
Taking these other commitments into account – a cash-terms freeze in college funding, real terms 
increase in spending on concessionary travel, and cash or real terms freezes on existing welfare 
policies – could imply real terms cuts to remaining portfolios of 14-16%40. This cut of 14-16% 
needs to accommodate whatever additional funding the Government decides to allocate to 
achieve its objectives for educational attainment. 
                                                          
40
 As above, this is based on the extended fiscal consolidation scenario 
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Other commitments 
Finally, there are a number of commitments we anticipate will be borne within individual portfolios 
but will nevertheless represent an important draw on resources and will limit flexibility. 
Within the Health portfolio for example, the government is committed to ensuring that 
prescriptions and eye tests remain free, retaining the nursing and midwifery bursary, and to 
spending an additional £150 million on mental health over the parliament. The number of Modern 
Apprenticeships will rise to 30,000 a year by 2020, whilst the Education Maintenance Allowance 
will be retained. A cost to the public sector will be its contribution to the Apprenticeships Levy, 
possibly around £70 million per annum41.  
To reiterate, the Scottish Government might decide that – at least some of – these commitments 
can be met with less resource, in which case its ‘remaining’ budget would see smaller cuts over 
the parliament. But, given the relatively conservative nature of our assumptions, it is difficult to 
see how savings of this scale can be achieved without significant re-prioritisation. 
Finally, the Scottish Government has announced a new £500 million Growth Scheme comprising 
investment guarantees, and some loans, up to a value of £5 million.  The scheme requires 
approval by the UK Government and will form part of AME and therefore has no direct (immediate 
implications) for the Scottish resource DEL budget.  
Once again it is important that these changes are viewed in the round. The significant cutbacks 
estimated to occur are the direct consequence of the decision to prioritise other areas of 
spending such as health.  Critics of these cuts must explain what they would cut instead or by 
how much taxes would rise.  
 
3.4 Additional constraints on spending 
In addition to the revenue risks discussed in Section 3.2, the Scottish budget also faces a number 
of risks on the spending side. There are four key reasons why the above discussion may 
understate the challenge facing some portfolios.   
Inflation 
Earlier in 2016, inflation was forecast at around 2% per annum. The recent fall in sterling, 
together with lower interest rates, is expected to lead to higher inflation. In its August Inflation 
Report, the Bank of England forecast inflation could rise by around 0.4 percentage points in 2017 
and 2018.  Similarly, the National Institute for Economic and Social Research estimate that 
inflation may increase by 0.5 percentage points each year. 
Inflation has two implications.  
Most obviously, it reduces the real terms value of a given level of cash spending.  
                                                          
41
 It should be noted of course that Scotland will be receiving – through Barnett consequentials – a share of £500 million to be 
allocated between the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Governments.   
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The revisions to inflation forecast by the Bank of England and the National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research imply that the Scottish budget could be around 1.6% - or £390 million – less 
in real terms in 2020-21 than if the inflation forecast had not been revised.  
The second implication is what it means for spending commitments expressed in real terms.  
For example, under the Bank of England’s inflation forecast revisions, the commitment to protect 
the police budget in real terms could cost around £15 million per year more by 2020-21 than 
initially planned. Similarly the commitment on health could cost £175 million more per year in 
2020-21.  
Financing of capital investment 
Both the current Scottish Government and previous administrations have used a variety of 
revenue financed mechanisms to boost capital investment.  
These included the Public-Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes – 
up to 2007 – and then subsequently the Non-Profit Distributing (NPD) programme.  
Under these initiatives, the private sector finances the upfront capital costs of a project and, once 
operational, the public sector agrees to pay fees to cover capital costs, interest repayments and 
maintenance/service charges (usually for 25-30 years). 
The mechanisms are controversial in terms of value for money, the off-balance sheet nature of 
the commitments and the potential build-up of long-term debt and service obligations. However, 
successive administrations have argued that this is offset by the additional economic activity that 
is created, the enhancement of the asset base and the outcomes benefits that flow from 
infrastructure improvements.   
The outlook for such schemes is now a little uncertain. A recent ruling by the Office for National 
Statistics following recent changes in EU guidance classified a high-profile NPD project – the 
Aberdeen Western Periphery Route – as ‘public sector’ meaning that for accounting purposes the 
project is treated as being on balance sheet. Other projects, including the ‘Hub’ model have been 
unaffected42.   
Irrespective of the future of these initiatives, existing PPP/PFI and NPD commitments will make 
up a significant proportion of the Scottish budget – with the government forecast to spend around 
£1.243 billion each year over the course of this parliament on repayments.  
The allocation of such commitments is not uniform across portfolios. In 2016-17 for example, 
£350 million of the Education portfolio and £250 million of the Health portfolio was allocated for 
operational PPP repayments alone. Whilst this represents only 2% of the Health resource budget, 
it represents almost 11% of the Education budget.  
                                                          
42
 It is possible that there will be further changes in future to EU guidance on statistical classification and the Scottish 
Government and other administrations across Europe will need to take this into account in due course.  
43
 See Hudson (2016), Section 4 of www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/99386.aspx 
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In addition, the Scottish Government is itself now able to borrow directly to fund capital 
investment. From April, the government can borrow up to £450 million in any given year44.  
The Scottish Government has committed to spending no more than 5% of its DEL budget on 
repayments from revenue financing and its new capital borrowing. On the basis of current 
projects and plans, the government will spend around 4% of its budget on such payments in 
2017-18, rising to just over 4.2% in 2019-20 and 2020-2145. It therefore has some ‘headroom’ to 
invest further, although this requires committing more resources toward repayments over the 
medium term.  
Public sector payroll 
Public sector pay is one of the largest day-to-day elements within the Scottish budget.  
Surprisingly, the Scottish Government do not routinely publish information on public sector pay 
costs. This makes tracking issues such as pay growth over time difficult to discern.   
The latest available estimate is for 2013-14, with Scottish public sector pay estimated at £14.5 
billion – just over half (55%) of the Scottish resource budget46.  
It would be wrong to think of pay solely as a spending constraint. Public services are 
fundamentally delivered by people, particularly in ‘frontline’ services such as the NHS, education 
and policing. Thus a commitment to improve public service outcomes is almost inevitably going to 
require increases in either the numbers employed or pay and progression structures. 
That being said, given its size, the public sector payroll can act as a significant pressure on 
budgets particularly in the short-run. More generous pay awards can lead to funding pressures, 
whilst any attempt to reduce the pay-bill without compulsory redundancies – something that the 
Scottish Government has strongly resisted – can only happen over time.  
The public sector pay-bill has increased in recent years as a result of UK tax and pension reform. 
Changes to Employer NICs cost the public sector in Scotland £250 million in 2016-17. Whilst in 
2019-20, a change in the discount rate used for valuing public service pensions is likely to add a 
further £200 million to costs.  
In practice, the Scottish Government determines pay for a fraction of the public sector, principally 
the devolved civil service and agencies. This is around 35,000 employees – 6% of devolved 
public sector employment – with an estimated bill of around £1.4 billion in 2016-17.  
The government does however, have influence over pay awards within the wider public sector 
either through joint negotiation, interaction with UK-wide review bodies, or the allocation of 
budgets.   
The Scottish Government has adopted a twin-track approach to pay in recent years.  
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 Borrowing £450 million for ten years at a 5% interest rate would imply annual repayments of approximately £60 million. 
45
 See Hudson (2016) referenced previously.  
46
  www.parliament.scot/FinancialScrutiny/Affordability.pdf  
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The first strand has been a policy of no-compulsory redundancies, maintenance of ‘progression’ 
and increases for those on the lowest incomes. These are not without cost. Progression for 
example is estimated to cost around £120 million across the devolved public sector.  
One significant new commitment is for all social care workers to receive the Living Wage by 
October 2016. This is above the new National Living Wage – which on its own the Resolution 
Foundation estimate will cost the public sector in the UK around £2.3 billion47 (with likely costs in 
Scotland of £200 million).  
The second strand has been pay restraint with modest (below inflation) pay awards.  
Even then, such commitments can be significant, particularly at a time of overall budget 
constraint. For example, a 1.5% award within the Scottish Government’s areas of responsibility is 
estimated to cost around £20 million. If replicated across the NHS, police and fire and rescue, a 
1.5% pay increase will cost over £150 million.  
Continued pay restraint will be challenging. Pay awards have largely been frozen or grown at 
around 1% since 2010 and 2011. Coupled with increased employee NICs, the take-home pay of 
many public sector workers has fallen sharply.  
The implications of devolved welfare powers 
Under the Scotland Act 2016, powers over a number of social security benefits are being 
devolved –  
x Six of these benefits relate to people who are either carers, disabled, or ill (Disability 
Living Allowance, Attendance Allowance, Carer’s Allowance, Personal Independence 
Payment, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit, and Severe Disablement Allowance)48. 
  
x Four of the benefits are currently part of the Regulated Social Fund (Winter Fuel 
Payment, Cold Weather Payment, Funeral Payment, and Sure Start Maternity Grant). 
 
x Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs, which are used to help those struggling with 
their rent payments) are also to be devolved.  
Expenditure on these totalled £2.8 billion in 2015-16 in Scotland (Table 3.2). It has not yet been 
agreed when the social security benefits will be devolved.  
Additionally, the Scottish Government will gain the power to ‘top-up’ reserved benefits, and to 
create new benefits in devolved areas. There will also be new powers over employability 
programmes (i,e. the Work Programme and Work Choice). 
There has been much discussion about how the government could use these new powers. In 
terms of disability benefits for example, there could be scope to reform the way that assessments 
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 www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/care-to-pay-meeting-the-challenge-of-paying-the-national-living-wage-in-social-
care/  
48
 For further details on each benefit, see http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/99697.aspx    
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are made, who makes them, and how often they are carried out; there might also be scope to 
integrate these benefits with the work of the integrated health and social care boards.  
Some (including the government’s Poverty Adviser Naomi Eisenstadt) have questioned whether it 
makes sense to pay Winter Fuel payments to all pensioners, or whether it should be adjusted to 
take account of income.  
Table 3.2:  Newly Devolved Benefits   
  
Spend 2015-16 
£m 
Caseload  
2015 
Disability Living Allowance 1,399 325,000 
Attendance Allowance 487 128,000 
Carer's Allowance 224 64,000 
Personal Independence Payment  315 56,000 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit 91 27,000 
Severe Disablement Allowance 49 13,000 
Winter Fuel Payment 180 1,077,000 
Cold Weather Payment 3 n/a 
Funeral Payment  4 n/a 
Sure Start Maternity Grant 3 n/a 
Discretionary Housing Payments 13 118,000 
Total  2,768  
Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland: 2015-16 and Scottish Government49  
It is clear that the Scottish Government is likely to come under pressure to reverse – at least in 
part – key elements of the UK Government’s welfare reform agenda. A likely area of focus is 
Personal Independence Payments (PIP). However, under the BGA for welfare, any policy that is 
more generous in Scotland relative to comparable spending in rUK will carry a financial cost50. 
Aside from these pressures two other issues are worth highlighting.  
First, welfare benefits are more demand-driven than day-to-day departmental spending. This is 
why they typically form part of AME rather than DEL. However, once transferred to Scotland they 
will form part of DEL and will be managed in the same way as all other expenditure programmes. 
This poses a risk. Once qualifying criteria are set and to ensure payments can always be met, the 
Scottish Government may wish to build some form of reserve which they can draw on in times of 
need. This will of course come at the opportunity cost of spending elsewhere.  
Second, a key challenge for the Scottish Government will be to actually deliver these new welfare 
powers. A new delivery agency is planned. At the same time, the UK Government will make a 
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 See Scottish Government Social Security Statistics http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Social-
Welfare/SocialSecurityforScotland  
50
 Under the planned mechanism, the growth in the block grant will change in line with the corresponding social security spend 
per person in the rest of the UK – up until 2021. This will protect Scotland from differential population growth and a higher 
starting base of welfare expenditure.  
  
 
Fraser of Allander Institute, September 2016  67 
 
Scotland’s Budget:  2016 – Chapter 3:  Spending commitments and constraints 
 
one-off transfer of £200 million, plus an annual transfer of £66 million, to assist with the 
implementation and administrative costs associated with all the new powers (and not just 
welfare).  
It is not clear whether this funding will fully cover the costs of delivery. As an illustration, the 
National Audit Office reported in 2014 that the investment cost of Universal Credit (over the 12 
years to 2022-23) was around £1.7 billion51. Scaling that to the equivalent caseload for devolved 
benefits implies an implementation cost of around £400 million. Running costs are also likely to 
be tight.   
Clearly there are substantial differences in the schemes. However it provides an illustration – at 
the very least – of the importance of careful consideration of delivery methods. There may be a 
trade-off between the level of ambition a radically new set of benefit structures may allow for and 
an alternative less risky option which more closely resembles the existing UK scheme.    
 
3.5 Capital spending 
The Scottish Government’s capital budget allocation across portfolios is shown in Table 3.3 
below.  
The Social Justice and Communities portfolio has a budget of £1.1 billion; £600 million of which is 
local government and £430 million housing – principally the construction of affordable homes.  
Table 3.3:  Scottish capital budget allocation, £m 
 2015-16 2016-17 
Health, Wellbeing & Sport 226.5 489.5 
Finance, Constitution and Economy 226.6 220.8 
Education and Lifelong Learning 103 85.5 
Fair Work, Skills and Training - - 
Justice 111 74.8 
Social Justice, Communities & Pen. Rights 1,221.60 1,064.00 
of which Local Government 861.3 606.9 
Rural Affairs, Food and the Environment 52.1 57.4 
Culture, Europe & External Affairs 28.7 26.7 
Infrastructure, Investment & Cities 1,066.30 1,120.20 
Administration   
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 3.6 3.6 
Total  3,039.4 3,142.5 
Notes: excludes financial transactions. Source: Scottish Draft Budget 2016-17 
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 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/public-accounts/Universal-Credit-progress-update.pdf 
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The Infrastructure, Investment and Cities portfolio has an allocation of £1.1 billion – with 
unsurprisingly, motorways and trunk roads (£513 million) and rail (£483 million) the largest 
elements.  
In 2015-16, the Scottish Government gained powers to borrow up to 10% of its CDEL budget – 
around £300 million that year – to fund capital investment. The allocations for 2015-16 shown in 
Table 3.3 are based upon these powers being utilised in full.  
In the end, an accounting adjustment agreed with HM Treasury to address the re-classification of 
the Aberdeen Western Periphery Route NPD project, meant that the additional cover required 
effectively counted against the annual borrowing limit.  
The Scottish Government has not so far used its capital borrowing powers in 2016-17. Any 
borrowing is likely to occur at the end of the financial year once the full CDEL allocation has been 
used up.  
In August, the First Minister announced a funding package of £100 million for capital investment, 
made available from underspend in previous years. Details on allocations were set out in the 
Scottish Government’s 2016 Programme for Government52. 
 
3.6 Local Government 
Local government faced a particularly challenging settlement in 2016-17. With the Scottish 
resource budget falling by 1.5% in real terms, combined with spending on health increasing 
above inflation, large cuts were inevitable in other areas. In the end, the revenue grant to councils 
was cut by around 5% in real terms between 2015-16 and 2016-17.  
Of course, the cut to local government could be interpreted as being substantially less if the £250 
million funding for Health and Social Care partnerships announced in the Budget is included in 
the calculation. However, this was allocated to the integrated Health and Social Care Boards via 
the health portfolio and was not ‘new money’ for local government to spend. 
At the same time, to receive their full grant allocation, councils had to agree to freeze council tax 
for the ninth successive year, maintain a pupil/teacher ratio at the same level as 2015, and pay 
the Living Wage to social care workers. Failure to deliver on any of these elements would result in 
a financial penalty. Furthermore, it has since been confirmed that additional funding for the 
Scottish Attainment Fund will bypass local authorities and be allocated direct to schools. 
Tensions remain therefore in two areas: disagreement over the scale of the funding squeeze on 
councils; and increasing concerns about the extent to which conditions attached to funding 
settlements to deliver ‘national’ priorities impinge on councils’ policy autonomy. 
The outlook for local government over the parliament looks just as challenging, if not more so.  
As outlined above, once the Scottish Government’s policy commitments are considered, 
unprotected areas will face significant real terms cuts. Councils are part of this ‘unprotected’ 
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 Page 30 - http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00505210.pdf  
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element. Having faced real terms cuts since 2010-11 of around 11% on a like-for-like basis53, 
without reform – either within councils or more widely – the room to manoeuvre is limited.  
Yet it is likely that a number of the Scottish Government’s key policy pledges will need to be 
delivered in whole or in part by councils. With elections in 2017, local government resourcing will 
come under the spotlight. For these reasons, we focus attention in this section on issues around 
local government finance.  
Local government resource spending is a function of: 
x The revenue grant from the Scottish Government (around 40% of resource income); 
 
x Revenues from Council Tax (just over 10%); 
 
x Non-Domestic Rates Income/Business Rates (around 25%); 
 
x Service income, fees and charges, including specific grants from the Scottish 
Government and NHS (around 25%); and 
 
x Housing rents (around 5%), although these revenues are ring-fenced for housing 
purposes; 
The revenue grant 
Each year, the Scottish Government negotiates a settlement for the revenue grant with COSLA, 
the organisation representing local government in Scotland54. The settlement typically takes into 
account the Scottish Government’s total resource budget (in the past, COSLA has sought to 
maintain local government revenue as a share of total spending), and any policy commitments 
the Scottish Government expects local government to deliver. 
What is the outlook for the local authority revenue grant in 2017-18 and beyond?  
Taking the scenario of extended fiscal consolidation set out above, we have already seen that the 
outlook for ‘unprotected’ parts of the Scottish budget is of real terms cuts of 13-16% over the 
course of this parliament.  
On an annualised basis, this would imply an average cut of 3.5% to 4.1% between 2016-17 and 
2020-21 – or a cut of around £1 billion to the local government resource grant over the course of 
the parliament based upon the scenarios set out above. 
At the same time however, some of the Scottish Government’s policy commitments will have 
delivery implications for local government which could add to or ease the funding pressures.  
Most obvious is childcare. COSLA will begin budget negotiations with the government in early 
September. Local authorities will no doubt seek the full transfer of the £500 million earmarked for 
the expansion in childcare.  
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 Audit Scotland: Overview of Local Government in Scotland 2016 http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/report/an-overview-of-local-
government-in-scotland-2016   
54
 This includes all local authorities in Scotland, excluding Aberdeen, Glasgow, Renfrewshire and South Lanarkshire. 
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It remains to be seen however, what proportion of the estimated costs of the childcare policy – 
outlined in Section 3.2 – will actually be passed on to local government. In order to ensure that 
provision is both flexible and high quality, the Scottish Government may seek to implement the 
policy in a variety of ways. Even if delivery responsibility does fall largely to councils, the extent to 
which councils might be expected to deliver at least part of the commitment from existing budgets 
will undoubtedly be a key aspect of the upcoming budget negotiations.  
On the assumption that the revenue grant to local government is cut by around 13.5% over the 
course of the parliament on a like for like basis, but that the costs associated with delivering the 
childcare commitment are rolled into the revenue grant, then the forecast for the local government 
revenue is a real terms cut of around 7-8% between 2016-17 and 2020-21. 
Non-domestic rates 
NDR are set by the Scottish Government, collected by local government and paid into the 
Scottish Government’s NDR ‘pool’. They are then distributed to local authorities. The Scottish 
Government guarantees to local government the combined general revenue grant and the 
distributable NDR income figure. 
In recent years, NDR income has risen in real terms as a result of increases in the tax rate and 
growth of the tax base (the number of properties on which the tax is levied). At the same time 
however, the Scottish Government has expanded the availability of various relief schemes – 
including the Small Business Bonus (which is estimated to cost around £170 million per annum). 
The medium-term outlook for NDR income is somewhat uncertain given the Barclay Review of 
Business Rates. The Scottish Government has also indicated that the rate of growth in NDR 
income has slowed, perhaps leading to a deficit in the NDR income pool which will have to be 
funded in due course.  
For simplicity, we assume that NDR revenues in Scotland will follow trend growth of NDR in the 
UK as a whole (as forecast by the OBR at the time of the March 2016 Budget). This implies a 
0.6% real terms fall in revenues over the period to 2020-21. This assumption is not unreasonable, 
given the SNP’s manifesto commitment to ‘expand the Small Business Bonus, and increase the 
number of small businesses that pay no rates’.  
Council tax 
Domestic properties in Scotland are assigned to one of eight council tax bands (A to H). 
Individual councils set the ‘tax rate’ – the amount paid annually by a property in Band D – but the 
Scottish Government sets the ratios between the bands55.  
Since 2008-09, the Scottish Government and local authorities have agreed to freeze the council 
tax. As a result, revenues have grown relatively slowly (reflecting some growth in the number of 
properties liable to tax). For each year the freeze has been maintained, the government has 
transferred an additional £70 million to local authorities to compensate for the loss in revenue. 
The Scottish Government has made two major new commitments on council tax.  
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 For example, Band H properties are charged 2.1 times a Band D property, so if a Council sets the Band D tax rate at £1,100, 
then Band H properties in that area will be charged £2,200. 
  
 
Fraser of Allander Institute, September 2016  71 
 
Scotland’s Budget:  2016 – Chapter 3:  Spending commitments and constraints 
 
The first is that it will allow councils to increase council tax rates by up to a maximum of 3% from 
2017-18. In many ways, this puts local authorities in a tricky position. In a period of tight budget 
constraints, to choose not to increase council tax would seem counterintuitive. On the other hand, 
council tax accounts for only 15% of income on average (so a 3% increase results in a less than 
½% increase in local authorities’ overall budget). Politically, councils may have a difficult job in 
explaining to residents why bills are going up at the same time that services are being reduced. 
The most likely outcome is perhaps that COSLA will seek agreement that all councils will raise 
council tax by the full 3% cap – although this is not necessarily a guaranteed outcome, especially 
in an election year. On the assumption that 3% increases are implemented in subsequent years, 
council tax revenues will rise to around £2.3 billion by 2020-21. 
The second commitment is to attempt to make council tax “fairer” by increasing the multipliers for 
Bands E, F, G and H. Low-income households living in higher banded properties will be 
exempted from the increases, and there will also be some additional support for low-income 
households with children, regardless of council tax band.  
The net revenue impact of this policy is around £100 million per year. However, rather than 
flowing to local authorities, the Scottish Government has indicated that this money will be 
allocated directly to schools to boost attainment.  
Capital spending by Councils  
Local authorities also receive a capital grant from the Scottish Government. In 2016-17, this 
totalled £481 million, on top of which they received £110 million in specific capital grants. 
Local authorities can also fund capital investment by borrowing (via a prudential regime). In 2014-
15, around 42% of councils’ capital investment came from the general capital grant, one third 
from borrowing, and the remainder from specific grants and asset sales.  
In recent years, local government have also made substantial use of PPP/PFI and NPD 
mechanisms, particularly to fund investment in new schools. Local authorities annual payments 
under these projects are expected to total £500 million in 2016-17 rising to £550 million by the 
end of the parliament. 
Summary 
Table 3.4 shows forecasts for the possible evolution of local government resources from the 
resource grant, NDR income, and council tax over the course of the parliament.  
Under the scenario of extended consolidation that we outline here, the resource grant is expected 
to fall by around 13.5% in real terms on a like-for-like basis between 2016-17 and 2020-21. 
Depending on the negotiations around delivery of childcare (and potentially any commitment to 
retain teacher numbers), the final grant settlement may end up looking more generous (or at 
least, less challenging).  
Remember however that our estimates from earlier in this chapter were that the Scottish 
Government’s resources for unprotected areas could fall by up to 17% under a scenario where 
devolved Scottish revenues grow relatively more slowly.  
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Table 3.4:  Local Government income from general grant and tax, £m and forecast real terms 
change to 2020-2156 
  
2016-17 
£m 
Change, 2016-17-
2020-21 
Annualised change, 2016-17-
2020-21 
General Resource Grant 6,834 -13.5% -3.5% 
NDRI 2,769 -0.6% -0.1% 
Council Tax 2,053 3.7% 0.9% 
Total resource 11,656 -7.4% -1.9% 
Source: FAI calculations 
NDR income is forecast to fall by 0.6% in real terms. Council Tax is forecast to increase by 4% in 
real terms, assuming that the council tax rate increases by 3% in each year. Chart 3.4 puts these 
forecasts in a historical context. 
Chart 3.4:  Local government resource from General Resource Grant, Council Tax and NDR, 
outturn and forecast, £m (2016-17 prices) 
 
Source: Local Government Finance Circulars, various years; GERS; FAI calculations 
Note: the relatively large fall in the resource grant in 2013-14 was due to the transfer of police and fire services from local 
authorities to new national agencies 
Local government will clearly face a challenging budget settlement in this parliament.  
Spending on all service areas (with the exception of social work) declined between 2010-11 and 
2014-1557. Faced with such spending pressures, it might be expected that councils would cut 
spending on non-statutory areas, but the counterweight to this is that elected members have 
been reluctant to cut non-statutory services for fear of the political ramifications.  
Councils have managed to make efficiency savings in several areas without impacting on the 
quality of service delivery (at least not directly). Management structures have been streamlined, 
non-operational assets have been rationalised, back-office functions have been restructured, and 
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 Note the 2016-17 figure excludes the £250 million allocated to health and social care integration authorities.  
57
 Audit Scotland (2016) as referenced previously. 
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there is a greater emphasis on shared services. However, cuts to services are likely to become 
increasingly apparent as budgets are further reduced. 
Despite real terms cuts, councils have also developed a number of coping mechanisms in 
response to reduced budgets. They have become more reliant on charges as a source of income 
(although larger, city authorities have greater flexibility in this respect than smaller, rural 
authorities).  
Some councils have been building up reserves in recent years in anticipation of using them to 
bridge a gap between incomes and spending commitments. At 1st April 2016, local authorities 
estimated general fund reserves were £1.046 billion58. This may help deal with budgetary 
pressures in 2017-18, but it clearly can only be a temporary solution; and over half of these 
reserves have already been earmarked. Moreover, the amount of usable reserves varies 
substantially across councils, and for some, the option of using reserves to deal with shortfalls in 
2017-18 and beyond simply does not exist.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
There is clearly some uncertainty around exactly how the Scottish Government’s budget will 
evolve over the lifetime of the parliament. Even before the vote to leave the EU, the Scottish 
budget was expected to fall by 3-4% over the period to 2020-21. If the UK Government extends 
its consolidation plans as a result of the referendum, real terms resource budget falls for the 
Scottish Government of 4-6% are possible.  
The Scottish Government has committed to increase real terms spending on health. This 
continues a trend of real terms increases in health spending since 1999. 
Perhaps the Scottish Government’s most high profile commitment in this parliament is to double 
the provision of childcare, with the aim to achieve a transformational step-change in attainment 
and a reduction in educational inequalities.  
The commitments to health and childcare, combined with a commitment to maintain real terms 
spending on the police, imply that unprotected areas of the Scottish resource budget will face 
cuts of between 13.5% and 15.3% on average by 2020-21, under our ‘extended consolidation’ 
scenario. Even among ‘unprotected’ portfolios however, funds have been earmarked for a 
number of within-portfolio commitments.  
Further policy opportunities – but also funding constraints – are coming down the line when new 
welfare powers are devolved later in the parliament.  
One area where the Scottish Government is less constrained is in capital spending. The potential 
to offer an accelerated programme of capital spending in future may prove a useful bargaining 
tool for the Scottish Government in negotiating the scale of resource budget cuts for some 
portfolios.  
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 Provisional Outturn 2015-16 and Budget Estimates 2016-17 - http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/06/9117/downloads  
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Negotiations over the local government settlement are likely to be particularly challenging. Based 
on the scenarios set out above, local government could face a budget squeeze of around £1 
billion by 2020-21.   
The local authority funding settlement is thus likely to be a focus of political debate, not just over 
the level of resource but the future of local government more generally and the relative balance of 
central government accountability and local autonomy.  
The room for manoeuvre is likely to be highly constrained. Careful budgeting will be required if 
the Scottish Government is to deliver on its policy priorities whilst still delivering outcomes in other 
areas.  This is likely to require bold and creative thinking both in terms of the options for revenue 
raising, and hard decisions on spending that go beyond simple salami-slicing approaches. We 
turn to these broader issues in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Choices, 
challenges and opportunities 
 
x The clear conclusion of this report is that Scotland’s budget faces a challenging and 
uncertain outlook over the course of this parliament.  
 
x The Scottish Government will soon have greater power than ever before to vary that 
budget, but it will also be exposed to new risks. The government will also have new 
responsibilities, including the delivery of complex welfare powers, and potentially an even 
wider remit if certain powers currently controlled at the EU level are passed to Holyrood.  
 
x With the uncertainty of Brexit, a weakening UK fiscal position, ongoing UK welfare reform, 
and a fragile Scottish economy, the implementation of Scotland’s new fiscal powers over 
the next few years could not have come at a more challenging time.  
 
x In this environment, the importance of effective fiscal policy development, governance and 
scrutiny is more crucial than ever.  
 
x In this final chapter, we discuss some of the choices, challenges and opportunities facing 
Scottish policymakers. We deliberately avoid specifying individual policy solutions but 
instead highlight key themes we think should frame the debate in the run up to the 
publication of the Scottish Draft Budget later in the year.  
 
x This agenda will set the scene for the work of the Institute in the months (and years) ahead.  
 
x Firstly, it is clear that – despite significant improvements in recent years – budget decisions 
need to be based much more explicitly on intended outcomes rather than funding inputs. 
There also needs to be greater recognition of the opportunity costs of spending decisions, 
particularly over the medium to long-term.  
 
x Secondly, with Scotland’s new tax powers the debate can move beyond simply deciding 
how best to distribute a block grant. The powers provide a set of tools to vary revenue but 
also to achieve wider objectives around re-distribution, growth, efficiency and the balance 
of tax and spend in Scotland. There are important constraints on these powers however, 
and policy needs to be underpinned by recognition of the costs and practical challenges in 
different tax policy choices.  
 
x Thirdly, to have an informed debate about Scotland’s fiscal future and how best to use 
these new powers, some key reforms to the role of Parliament and civic Scotland in 
scrutinising and influencing budgetary plans are needed. A renewed emphasis on multi-
year budgeting, long-term strategic planning and transparency will all help assist in 
preparing Scotland to best meet the challenges and opportunities ahead. 
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The budget challenge facing the Scottish Government is arguably the toughest 
since coming to power in 2007. Following over five years of real-terms cuts, 
the combination of an uncertain economic outlook and the complexity and 
risks inherent in the new fiscal framework means that tough choices will be 
required. The processes through which these choices are made will influence 
how effective they are. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
These are uncertain times for Scottish policy makers. New powers bring new opportunities, but 
also new risks. Constraints are tighter than ever, and room for manoeuvre is limited. 
Whilst the immediacy of the challenge will fall on the Scottish Government, it is vital that political 
parties from all sides set out their priorities, including how they will fund new commitments, 
deprioritise others, and manage increasing demand on public services.  
At the centre of all this are fundamental questions about the underlying vision for Scottish fiscal 
policy in the light of the new tax and welfare powers - what are the primary economic and social 
objectives we are trying to achieve? Does the way we are implementing spending and tax policy 
promote and help secure these?  
These basic questions of rationale and objective-setting are crucial for effective fiscal policy and 
deciding how to use it as a tool to deliver better economic, equity and sustainability outcomes. 
This agenda lies at the heart of our work programme over the coming years.  
This chapter sets out three key themes we believe should underpin the debate as the 
government prepares its Draft Budget. In a world where the economic (and fiscal) outlook is 
highly uncertain, it is vital that policymakers –  
x Make securing outcomes the driving force for determining the allocation of resources;  
 
x Take a strategic approach to efficient tax policy design, recognising the need to balance 
objectives around revenue raising with the goal of promoting economic growth; and, 
 
x Conduct the debate in an open and constructive manner which has good economic and 
financial governance at its core.   
 
4.2 Why this is important 
This report has highlighted some of the key macroeconomic drivers that will set the backdrop for 
the delivery of the Scottish Draft Budget later this year.  
Chapter 1 described the fragile and uncertain economic outlook, whilst Chapter 2 showed how 
this weakening outlook will pose a fiscal challenge both for Scotland and the UK.  
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Although we may see some stimulus measures from the UK Government in the next few months 
– perhaps a temporary tax cut or a boost to capital spending – the balance of probability is for the 
Scottish budget to continue to face a squeeze (and possibly quite a substantial squeeze) over the 
course of the new parliament.   
The importance of effective fiscal policy in such an environment is crucial.  
To help, the Scottish Government will soon have greater power than ever before to vary its 
budget, whether through tax policy, borrowing, or encouraging faster economic growth. But it 
faces risks too that its new devolved revenues might grow more slowly. A weakening offshore 
economy, or a buoyant housing market in the south east of England are the types of risks that 
pose a threat to the Scottish budget, but that the Scottish Government can do little about. 
The Scottish Government will have the opportunity to use the full spectrum of its spending 
resources (around 2/3rds of total public spending in Scotland) to respond to the challenge. 
Chapter 3 showed how choices already made about how to allocate the Scottish budget – 
including new commitments and long-term constraints – will already dictate key trends in 
spending allocations.  
Layered on top of all of this are the new administrative responsibilities being devolved. Most 
importantly, nearly £3 billion of welfare. This brings enormous opportunities to pursue a distinctive 
Scottish model of social security and to better link up currently devolved responsibilities in health, 
education and skills with these new powers. But effective delivery is not straightforward – as 
recent experiences with farm payments have shown – and comes with its own pressures.  
A final consideration is the potential administrative implications of Brexit. Might Scotland take 
responsibility for designing a system of agricultural support and allocating funds for regeneration 
and scientific research? How much funding will be transferred? Will becoming free of EU rules on 
‘sales taxes’ such as VAT enable even further devolution of tax powers than had been envisaged 
by the Smith Commission?  
In such a complex world of economic and fiscal uncertainty, constitutional reform and 
administrative complexity, there has never been a clearer need for government and civic society 
to engage in a robust debate on the fundamental role of fiscal policy in Scotland.  
What are the overriding economic and social objectives we are trying to pursue? How can 
Scotland’s full suite of fiscal powers – both new and old – be deployed to most effectively deliver 
them?  
These are clearly big challenges. We do not seek to suggest specific solutions in this report. 
Instead we outline some of the key issues, and highlight the change needed to the way budget 
debates take place if we are to successfully address some of these challenges.  
 
4.3 Securing outcomes 
The first theme is the focus on outcomes and ensuring that, above all else, this is the driving force 
for determining the allocation of resources in the future. 
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This will not be easy. It requires a fundamental re-shaping of the way in which the debate is 
conducted. It will require a much stronger evidence base and level of analysis which is focussed 
on finding out what actually delivers results and the fiscal effort required.  
It may also increase the spending pressures in some areas as plans adjust, but it is vital that 
longer-term strategies increasingly feed through to short-medium term actions. Much of this is 
about managing demand into the future rather than reducing immediate costs.  
If an outcomes focus approach is delivered, it will clearly have implications for the way in which 
certain public services are managed and delivered which will in turn require careful workforce 
planning and investment.  
Outcomes delivery 
Policymakers are generally good at setting out how they will allocate funding. But they tend to be 
less clear about the factors that underpin those decisions – what outcomes are we anticipating 
and how will the resource allocated help to deliver those outcomes?  
Important strides have been made in recent years to boost the recognition of outcomes in 
delivering public services, most visibly captured through the government’s National Performance 
Framework59. Particular initiatives such as the Early Years Collaborative have worked well but 
success is patchy. Explicit links to the budget process remain largely undeveloped.  
Indeed, the Scottish Parliament elections earlier this year laid bare the nature of the way that 
budgetary promises are still often made.  
Policy commitments are invariably made in relation to spending inputs – “£150 million extra on 
priority X; protection of portfolio Y; 1,000 more staff for service Z”. 
In this process, consideration of the outcomes that we want to achieve, and how the 
commitments and promises might support their delivery, can often get crowded out.  
In times of budget constraint, understanding the rationale for spending decisions takes on even 
greater importance. Rather than making spending pledges based on inputs, we should be 
thinking about the impacts of policy over the medium to longer term, and how these will support 
the delivery of key performance objectives. 
For example, rather than referring to ‘health’ simply as the totality of the spend within the current 
portfolio allocation, how can we view ‘health’ in a broader context to include investments in 
community programmes on mental wellbeing, work to reduce re-offending or addiction and efforts 
to boost employment prospects in communities with poor social and health track records?  
The issue of outcome focussed public services has been discussed for a number of years. A full 
outcomes based approach to the budget – that is where individual budget allocations are 
presented in terms of how they contribute to outcomes rather than according to traditional 
portfolios – is clearly a challenge.  But if the intensity of the drive in Scotland toward outcomes is 
to be increased, now is surely the time for a much deeper look at how this could be achieved. 
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 See http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/purposestratobjs  
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Initial first steps could include parliament and/or government mapping current spend to a small 
set of outcomes and tracing the interdependencies between portfolios.  
Opportunity costs 
Greater awareness is also needed about the opportunity costs of budget choices, particularly 
over the longer-term. In the context of declining resources, protecting a given service is all well 
and good, but there is a need for strategic choices in unprotected areas too.  
There is rarely, if ever, consideration of the opportunity costs of commitments (i.e. the impact of 
cuts in other areas). 
Since 2009-10, there have been substantial changes to the way that the Scottish budget is 
allocated. The total health budget (TME) has increased by 6% in real terms. In contrast, 
Enterprise, Energy and Tourism has fallen 23%, Further and Higher Education is down 21%, as 
are Rural Affairs and the Environment (down 7%) and Culture and External Affairs (down 12%). 
Such comparisons are often misleading as definitions change and most of the historic 
comparative data that is publicly available includes demand-driven expenditures such as pension 
costs.  
But setting aside issues of exact comparability for the moment, whilst there may well be clear 
rationales for these policy trends - demographics and rising costs of medical technologies in 
health for example – do we have a clear sense of the likely medium and longer-term strategies 
and impacts of these decisions? Most often, the answer is probably not.   
As a result, it is often easy too for past policy decisions to become ‘locked in’. Policy 
commitments are easy to make in the good times when budgets are rising. But once implemented 
they become difficult to reverse – especially where they have become totemic in political terms – 
even if the current financial or economic environment makes them harder to justify.  
Budget planning and allocations should not just be forward-looking, but consider questions such 
as how well has money been spent previously, and what has it achieved. A more strategic 
budgetary process may help to overcome this ‘path-dependence’ in policy making. 
Prevention and delivery 
The call for a more outcomes based approach to budgeting is closely linked to the notion of 
‘preventative spending’ and prevention policies. The Christie Commission on Public Service 
Reform found that approximately 40 per cent of all public spending went to ‘clean up messes that 
could have been prevented’ at a lower financial and human cost60. 
Clear progress has been made with greater collaboration and partnership working than in the 
past. But the pace is well short of what is needed.  
Politicians from all sides recognise the clear need and budgetary advantage in targeting early 
intervention, but a multitude of factors – budgetary cycles, classification of spending by 
department or portfolio rather than outcome; challenges in identifying impact of intervention, and 
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so on – limit the extent to which prevention policies are pursued. As a result, many targets remain 
reactive (e.g. reducing waiting times rather than reducing the number of people in the queue). 
The final element which is crucial in this debate is the issue of how and who should deliver public 
services. The right solutions for people may differ across communities.  
Local delivery of services that is responsive to local needs can often result in better outcomes. 
Communities and individuals that are genuinely engaged in decisions on how public services are 
delivered perform better and can lead to more cost effective delivery. Improving the capacity 
within communities to engage in such a way can be challenging but even then, too often barriers 
can exist that prevent community-based solutions. 
This is not surprising as a move to a world where services are shaped around the needs of 
individuals and their families is a radical departure from the traditional top-down approach of 
central and/or local government delivery. It requires a shift in culture and approach to 
collaboration that is not easy. It is also likely to require an acceptance that there will be much 
greater diversity and divergence in the provision of public services between communities. 
Considerable work will be required to prepare, empower and support public services and their 
wider workforce to help deliver reform. Doing so however, will be a key avenue to help protect 
outcomes in the face of cuts to public services.  
 
4.4 The size of the spending envelope 
Having set out the core outcomes that are being sought, tough choices then have to be made 
about how they are paid for.  
In the past, the Scottish Government had no real scope to vary the size of its budget. In future, 
the government will now be able to vary its spending envelope in three ways: 
x Borrowing to fund capital investment; 
x Changing tax policy for the taxes that are devolved; and, 
x Implementing policies that grow its tax base and thus grow revenues. 
Borrowing 
It is important to note that the Scottish Government will not have the autonomy to alter the fiscal 
stance at a macroeconomic level, even after the new tax and welfare powers are transferred. Any 
increase in expenditure – devolved public services or welfare – must be matched by a 
corresponding increase in tax.  
The one exception is in capital expenditure with the Scottish Government now able to add to 
existing capital programmes by borrowing up to £450 million in any given year.  
As noted in Chapter 3, the Scottish Government has yet to draw down borrowing in 2016-17.  
Borrowing costs for the public sector are lower now than they have ever been. There is also a 
general acceptance that greater levels of investment is needed. In recent years, growth has been 
hampered by weak productivity. Investment in infrastructure – transport, communications, schools 
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and universities etc. – not only provides a short-term boost to construction, but may be one of the 
most effective ways of raising productivity in the medium/longer term. 
At the same time borrowing comes with a cost that will have to be paid for out of future budgets. 
We have seen the financial constraints that PFI schemes from the past can place on day-to-day 
budgets years down the line.  This makes a clearer strategy for borrowing and debt accumulation 
vital - how will the powers be used, and what will they be used to support? 
Devolved taxation 
The most important avenue through which the Scottish Government will now be able to determine 
the size of its spending envelope is through its newly expanded tax powers.   
It is important to note at the outset that taxation serves purposes beyond revenue raising. It can 
for example, be used to achieve objectives relating to redistribution. It can also be used to 
discourage less desirable behaviours (for example, activities that cause environmental harm). 
Tax policy also has a key role in encouraging and incentivising economic growth and economic 
development.  
But taxation can also influence behaviours in undesirable ways (for example, incentivising people 
to work less, or move house less often than they otherwise would), and it reduces the welfare of 
those who face the burden of the tax. A good tax system should achieve its aims whilst 
minimising undesirable behavioural effects. 
The scope for unintended behavioural effects of tax policy can be accentuated when they are 
operated by a devolved government which is part of a wider single market, and where it is 
responsible for some tax levers but not others – see Box 4.1.  
We illustrate some of these issues below by thinking in terms of the two core tax groups the 
Scottish Government is now responsible for - first in terms of income tax, and second in terms of 
taxes on land and property. 
Income tax is a highly visible tax; people tend to know fairly accurately how much they pay. It also 
has a broad base – income from employment, self-employment, and pensions is liable for ‘Non-
Savings, Non-Dividend’ income tax that will be devolved to the Scottish Government. 
Of all the taxes that the Scottish Government has at its disposal, income tax is the one where 
marginal changes in policy could have the greatest revenue impact. 1 pence on the basic rate of 
income tax is forecast to raise around £400 million in any given year. It is also the devolved tax 
that can shape the distribution of income the most effectively. Given the visibility of income tax, 
the scale of revenues, and the role of the tax in redistribution, it is not surprising that debates 
around income tax were at the heart of the 2016 Holyrood election.   
In general, the design of the UK income tax system that Scotland will retain, works in a way that 
accords reasonably well with what theory says an income tax system should look like. It is 
relatively simple and transparent, with a progressive rate schedule. To the extent that there are 
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weaknesses in the design, they will generally remain out with the control of the Scottish 
Government61.  
The question of how income tax bands and rates should be set in Scotland is therefore a political 
question around how much revenue the government wants to raise, and how it wants to raise it. 
Policymakers need to be explicit about how they intend to strike the balance between revenue 
raising, redistribution, and behavioural incentives, in setting out their tax plans. Thus far, most of 
the debate has centred upon only the first of these.  
Box 4.1:  Spill-overs between devolved and reserved taxes 
There is a strong case for devolving some taxes on accountability and economic efficiency 
grounds.  
However, devolving tax powers can create issues relating to the interaction of devolved and 
reserved policies. And tax devolution within a single market, where people are relatively 
mobile, can increase the behavioural response of taxpayers to tax policy changes. Both these 
factors may constrain the extent to which any Scottish administration is able to exercise its tax 
levers. 
In relation to behavioural effects, there was substantial debate during the Scottish elections 
about whether it would make sense to raise the Additional Rate of tax (paid by those earning 
over £150,000) if that tax increase was not implemented in rUK – i.e. re-instate a 50p top rate.  
What is clear is that, even at the UK level, the responses of Additional Rate taxpayers to tax 
changes are difficult to quantify precisely, but can be reasonably significant. In a devolved 
context, it is entirely possible – though by no means certain – that given the level of integration 
between the two economies, the potential behavioural responses could be even greater. There 
is therefore the risk that actual revenue outcomes may differ quite significantly (and may be 
qualitatively and not just quantitatively different) from what policy intended.  
The key point is that any change to income tax is likely to have behavioural implications – 
whether these implications involve migration between Scotland and rUK or, more likely, more 
nuanced implications for working and earning. Whilst there will always be some uncertainty 
about these effects, policy design should seek to mitigate and minimise these impacts as much 
as possible. 
In relation to the interaction effects between devolved and reserved taxes, one example of the 
spill-overs that can occur relates to the interaction between income tax and National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs). In recent years the UK Upper Earnings Limit (UEL) for employee national 
insurance contributions has tracked the higher rate threshold for income tax. The UEL 
employee NICs are paid at 12% of earnings but above UEL they drop to 2%. This means that 
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 Technically Scotland’s new income tax powers are not a devolved tax but a shared tax. The definition of income and the tax 
base is still determined by the UK Government. Criticisms of the income tax system that relate to the way that the tax base is 
defined (for example, the fact that pension contributions are subject to tax relief, but a substantial proportion of pension income 
can be taken as a tax-free lump sum on retirement) are out with the power of the Scottish Government to address. 
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the combined UK income tax and national insurance rate just below the higher rate threshold 
(or UEL) is 32% (20% + 12%) while just above the threshold it is 42% (40% + 2%).  
Chart 4.1: Income tax and national insurance interactions – Scotland and the UK 
 
Source: FAI calculations  
If the UK and Scottish governments choose to set different policies for the higher rate threshold 
as is now planned, an anomaly will emerge where some individuals in Scotland could be 
paying a marginal rate of 52% (40% income tax and 12% NICs) – the dotted red line in Chart 
4.1 – at the point between the Scottish higher rate threshold and the UK equivalent threshold.  
This interaction between devolved and reserved taxes might accentuate the behavioural 
implications of devolved policy change.   
In contrast to income tax, the system of land and property taxation – which Scotland will virtually 
control in entirety – is a long-way removed from what theory says a good tax system should look 
like. In that regard, it does not accord with the Scottish Government’s own principles for 
taxation62.  
Council Tax is regressive with respect to property value (i.e. the tax liability is lower as a 
percentage of property value for high value properties relative to low value properties) and with 
respect to income. The issue is exacerbated by the fact that there has been no property 
revaluation since the early 1990s63. Whilst the Scottish Government has announced a series of 
reforms to raise income, including around £70 million per annum from the removal of the freeze 
and £100 million from increasing the charges on properties in the highest valued bands, they 
stopped short of a radical overhaul of the tax.  
The Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (LBTT) is a tax on property transactions, and as such 
dissuades people from making beneficial transactions. For example, it may dissuade an older 
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 See https://www.revenue.scot/about-us/scottish-approach-tax  
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 See http://localtaxcommission.scot/download-our-final-report/  
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couple from downsizing, contributing to a shortage of properties for families. From an economic 
theory point of view, it is therefore an inefficient tax. 
Finally, Non-Domestic Rates (business rates) also have a number of design weaknesses that 
limit its efficiency – see Box 4.2.  
Box 4.2:  Issues in the design of non-domestic rates 
There is an extensive set of rates reliefs underpinning the system of business rates. Whilst 
each of these reliefs has a rationale, the reliefs also have potential unintended side effects. 
To take just one example, the ‘Small Business Bonus Scheme’ provides rates relief for 
businesses occupying low-value properties. The relief cost the Scottish Government 
£171million in 2014-1564. Around 100,000 business properties benefit from the scheme.  
Despite its name, the Small Bonus Scheme is not specifically targeted at small businesses, but 
at businesses occupying low-value properties. The relief therefore has the potential to distort 
economic activity in favour of more low-value properties and fewer high value properties. There 
may of course be a case for the relief, for example if it helps to support competition and variety 
in town centres. But the policy may at the same time have negative consequences for 
productivity and growth, if it dissuades relatively successful, growing businesses from 
upscaling to better premises that would better support their growth objectives.  
Perhaps more fundamentally, the evidence suggests that in the long-run, the impact of 
business rates reliefs is passed on to the owners of property via higher rents65. Thus the 
ultimate beneficiaries are likely to be property owners rather than the ‘small businesses’ that 
the scheme is intended to support. 
So although the Small Business Scheme is underpinned by an objective to support ‘small 
businesses’, it may nonetheless have a range of unintended consequences. Similar arguments 
can be made about other business rates reliefs, for example the relief for unoccupied 
properties. This reiterates the need for tax policy to be explicit about its objectives in the 
broadest sense. 
So there is scope for further reform of how we tax land and property in Scotland.  
Incumbent governments tend to respond to calls for tax reform by making cautious, incremental 
change. This is to an extent inevitable. But we need a clearer sense of what we are trying to 
achieve through our system of land and property taxation, and taxation in general.  
More generally, whilst it is vitally important to discuss the impacts of changes in tax policy to 
assess ‘winners and losers’, the debate needs to be broadened to consider wider issues such as 
the overall balance of tax and spend in the economy; and the impact on incentives and 
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 Scottish Local Government Financial Statistics, 2014-15 http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00494790.pdf  
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 For a more in-depth analysis of these issues, see Adam and Miller (2014) 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2014/gb2014_ch11.pdf  
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behaviours. This is particularly important in a system which is still tied to the UK in many 
important ways.  
Proposals to reduce the burden of APD are justified on economic development grounds, for 
example. But there does not yet appear to be a clear economic business case from the Scottish 
Government which sets out what these economic benefits might realistically be, who might 
benefit, nor what the opportunity costs might be – both in terms of revenue loss or impacts on 
pollution and climate change. 
The message from this section is that – whilst existing and new devolved tax powers bring 
substantial opportunities – there is scope to be clearer about the objectives of Scotland’s 
devolved tax policy in the round. Once the objectives are clearer, political consensus for reform 
may be easier to achieve. 
Economic growth 
The third avenue through which the overall spending envelope will be determined is through 
economic growth.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, the Scottish budget will from now on depend increasingly on the 
revenues from devolved (and assigned) taxes in Scotland, and in particular, how their growth 
compares to comparable taxes in rUK.  
Thus the Scottish Government now faces strong incentives (if it did not already) to stimulate 
economic growth. Over the longer-term, it will be the rate of growth that is by far the most 
significant determinant of the overall spending envelope, much higher than any individual tax 
policy measure. How can growth be boosted in Scotland and what are the key channels through 
which the Scottish Government can deliver it? 
It is important to note that it is harder for governments to stimulate economic growth than is often 
assumed. Growth prospects for individual countries are increasingly shaped by global 
macroeconomic conditions and the sentiments of businesses and consumers.  
That being said, there is still much that government can do. Two issues are important.  
Firstly, there is a consensus that the theoretical underpinnings of the Government’s Economic 
Strategy are sound66. Indeed, it has been an evolution of a consistent approach first set out in the 
early 2000’s.  
Turning the strategy into concrete policy actions that deliver results is much harder. The key 
issues that have held back Scotland historically – including weak productivity growth, low export 
intensity, weak management structures etc. – remain the key factors today. A much greater focus 
on ‘how’ to deliver the Economic Strategy is required.  
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 See http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Economy/EconomicStrategy  
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Official figures show that Scotland spends over £100 per head more each year on ‘Enterprise and 
Economic Development’ than in the UK as a whole – with around £1 billion spent in Scotland 
each year on ‘economic support and development’67.  
Are we getting value for money? Why – despite this investment– does Scotland have a lower 
business start-up and R&D rate than the UK? To what extent is there duplication in provision of 
business support? What programmes are more efficient than others? What programmes might be 
more/less effective post-Brexit?  
Secondly, alongside a focus on boosting growth in the economy more broadly, the Scottish 
Government could also try to raise revenues by supporting the growth in the tax base of the 
devolved taxes more directly. 
Income tax revenues for example, are a function of employment and wages. Higher employment 
rates and higher wages should lead to faster income tax growth. But the picture is also more 
nuanced than this.  
One of the success stories of the Scottish economy since the mid-2000s is that median wages 
and employment rates have converged to those of the UK (Chart 4.2). However, Scottish income 
tax revenues per capita have only converged to a limited extent, and remain around 12% below 
tax revenues per capita in the UK as a whole. 
The key reason is that there are relatively fewer high income earners in Scotland relative to rUK, 
and wages at the 90th percentile have not converged to the same extent as wages at the median 
(Chart 4.2). Scotland’s share of UK income tax revenues paid on incomes up to £30,000 is 
proportionate to its share of UK population (8.3%). But Scottish taxpayers account for only 6.2% 
of UK income tax paid on incomes between £150,000 and £200,000, and just 3.8% on incomes 
above £200,00068.  
Income tax liabilities have become increasingly concentrated on higher earners over the past 20 
years. This is in part due to a greater concentration of income at the top end of the distribution, 
but since 2007-08 it is a trend that has largely come about as a result of policy69.  
Consecutive UK governments have pursued a policy of raising the Personal Allowance in real 
terms. The result is that the proportion of the adult population who pay income tax has fallen from 
66% in 2007-8 to 56% in 2015-16. At the same time, the threshold for paying Higher Rate tax has 
fallen in real terms and a new Additional Rate of tax was introduced in 2010. As a result, the 
proportion of income tax paid by the top 1% of taxpayers increased from 21.3% to 27.5% 
between 1999-2000 and 2015-16 with the proportion paid by the top 10% up from 50.3% to 
58.9%. 
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 For a discussion see - https://fraserofallander.org/2016/07/08/brexit-what-next-for-scotlands-economic-strategy/  
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 Berthier (2015) http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_15-72_Income_Tax_in_Scotland.pdf  
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Chart 4.2:  Wages, employment rate and tax revenues per capita, Scotland as percentage of UK 
 
Source: ONS labour market statistics; Government Expenditure and Revenues Scotland; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
There are at least two implications for the Scottish Government. First, its existing tax policy 
commitments (to increase the Personal Allowance above inflation but to increase the Higher Rate 
by no more than inflation) will tend to increase the proportion of Scottish income tax revenue 
liabilities from higher earners. 
Second, the reliance on high earners as a source of devolved revenues means that the Scottish 
Government has an implicit incentive to attract and retain high income earners. In practical terms, 
this means promoting opportunities for employment within high-skilled, high-paying occupations. 
Whether this incentive creates any tension with the Scottish Government’s objectives to promote 
inclusivity and equality remains to be seen.  
These challenges certainly emphasise the importance of establishing clear budgetary priorities, 
and a clear medium-term strategy on taxation. Budgets should be clear about what are the basic 
objectives underlying the principle tax choices. There should also be recognition of the key 
drivers of tax revenue growth over time, and how policy will stimulate these.  
 
4.5 How the debate happens 
This report has highlighted the scale of the challenge facing the Scottish budget over the course 
of this parliament. A focus on securing outcomes and being clear about the purpose and aims of 
taxation will be key. There are no easy answers.  
But if we are to have an informed debate, how the debate itself happens will also be crucial. In 
this section we discuss three issues which will influence the conduct of the debate. 
Scrutiny 
The Draft Scottish Budget is typically produced in September, allowing three months of 
parliamentary scrutiny before the Budget Bill is published.  
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The OECD emphasises the importance of allowing sufficient time for budgetary scrutiny by 
parliaments, and the Scottish Parliament is seen as an example of best practice70.  
During the scrutiny period, the Scottish Parliament has the opportunity to suggest both alternative 
tax and alternative spending policies, and whilst the government is not obliged to accept the 
suggestions, it is required to provide a response before asking parliament to approve the budget. 
This contrasts with arrangements at Westminster, where parliament’s role is simply to approve 
the government’s financial decisions with no real time for formal scrutiny. 
In 2015-16, the time available for budget scrutiny was substantially curtailed. This was because 
the newly elected UK Government was due to set its spending plans at the Autumn Statement. It 
was argued that publishing a Draft Scottish Budget before the Autumn Statement would be 
unwise given that the UK’s spending plans (and hence Scotland’s block grant) would not be 
known with any certainty beforehand. With the Draft Budget published on 16 December, Subject 
Committees had only four weeks – which included the Christmas period – to report back to the 
Finance Committee.  
In 2016-17, the Scottish Government is again making the case to delay publication of the Draft 
Budget until after the Autumn Statement. The rationale is a combination of uncertainties relating 
to the estimation of the Block Grant Adjustments for devolved taxes, uncertainties surrounding 
the potential implications of the UK Government’s ‘reset’ of fiscal policy, and the potential for early 
announcement of possible tax changes to impact on behaviour71. 
There is clearly a difficult balancing act here. Publishing forecasts and plans that are then subject 
to significant change can clearly be damaging. But at the same time it is vital to protect 
parliament’s and civic Scotland’s role in budgetary scrutiny.  
Multi-year budgeting 
A single year budget is difficult to reconcile with medium term plans and priorities for government. 
Multi-year budgets can provide greater transparency around how the government’s objectives 
and goals will be achieved. They also provide greater certainty for departments and non-
departmental bodies alike, allowing them to plan more effectively.  
Scottish Budgets have traditionally covered multiple years. The 2016-17 Budget was an 
exception; as the last year of the Scottish Parliamentary session, it was seen as inappropriate for 
the government to set a multi-year budget. 
2017-18 will also be an exception.  
Giving evidence to the Finance Committee in June, Cabinet Secretary for Finance Derek Mackay 
said72: ‘With the degree of uncertainty and volatility that exists right now, it would be unwise to 
publish a three-year spending review. Therefore, we propose a one-year budget [in 2017-18] and 
will not deliver a three-year spending review at this time.’ 
                                                          
70
 Burnside (2016) http://www.parliament.scot/2016.08.17_SPICe_Comparative_Budget_processes_FINAL.pdf  
71
 A Budget Review Group has been established involving parliament officials and civil servants to consider issues around the 
timing of the Scottish budget in future years.  
72
 http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=10486&mode=pdf  
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It will be essential to return to multi-year budgeting as early as possible, in order that budgetary 
changes can be seen in light of the government’s medium term objectives and goals, and that 
public services can be planned for on a sustainable basis – see Box 4.3. 
Box 4.3:  Non-government service providers: the challenge of one-year budgets 
Over recent years, there have been moves to put the funding of key service deliverers in the 
non-government sector on to a sustainable footing, and to match the horizons of funding with 
the long-term, often preventative, nature of the services provided.   
Any regression from the progress toward multi-year settlements of 3-5 years – as appears to 
be increasingly common – poses a risk to the outcomes that government and service provider 
seek. A balance between avoiding funding settlements that are too long and those that are too 
short is of critical importance, not least to the beneficiaries of the service.  
Several crucial elements are worth highlighting. In each case, the challenge that is imposed by 
only funding bodies for a year or less can be acute – 
x Long term strategic thinking: Deep-seated societal challenges inherently need to be 
addressed over the long term through a coherent and sustained approach. Actions 
need to be grounded in evidence, experience, strategy and implementation excellence. 
The insecurity and uncertainty that short term funding brings can only diminish this; 
 
x Critical human capital: The delivery of high quality public services is inextricably linked 
to the quality and skill of the service provider’s staff.  The shorter the term of the 
funding settlement, the greater the challenge in recruiting and retaining valuable staff 
which in turn risks undermining outcomes;   
 
x Delivery partners: Maintaining excellent – and developing new – working relationships 
and partnerships with other service providers is critical.  Commitment and partnership 
will struggle if the funding pattern generates insecurity and the potential for high levels 
of staff turnover and the loss of the institutional knowledge and experience;   
 
x Late Determination of Settlements: The implications of short term funding settlements 
can be exacerbated by the late confirmation of settlements, often in the final quarter of 
the preceding financial year, and weeks prior to staff contracts coming to an end. This  
brings additional serious challenges for planning and staff retention;  
 
x Inefficiencies: There will be inefficiencies in renegotiating contracts on an annual or 
short term basis, both for the funding department and recipients. For small 
organisations, these costs may often be disproportionate; and, 
 
x Securing longer term income sources: Organisations can sometimes be placed at a 
serious disadvantage in their efforts to secure alternative and longer term funding 
where matched resources to secure this funding are required.  
In essence, if outcome objectives, founded on key services, are paramount in the mind of 
government – and they should be – then there is a risk that this is inadvertently undermined by 
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the process taken to manage the budget. The adverse impact will typically include delays and 
discontinuities in activities, delays in the delivery of outcomes, and dips in individual and 
collective productivity. 
Transparency 
Over time the government has made substantial improvements in the level and quality of 
budgetary and financial information that is provided and is publicly accessible.  
The provision of level 4 budgetary data shortly after publication of the Draft Budget for example, 
allows more detailed scrutiny than was previously possible. However, there remains significant 
scope to improve the availability and transparency of publicly available budget data.  
Even within a given Draft Budget document, figures in different sections are not comparable 
because of what they do (and do not include) – e.g. some include only cash but others include 
non-cash items, some figures include financial transactions whilst others do not.   
Comparisons of spend over time rarely exist in a comparable manner. This is a challenge at the 
UK level but particularly so in Scotland.  
Even the format of the presentation of budgetary data can be problematic; Budgets tend to be 
produced in pdf format, with no corresponding publication of data in excel.  
There is also a more fundamental issue in that the budget should not be seen simply as a set of 
spending allocations, but as the end point in a process of strategic planning. This should include 
– where possible – much greater emphasis on outcomes budgeting.  
With the new fiscal framework exceptionally complex and opaque – see Box 4.4 – and as the 
Scottish Government’s fiscal powers expand to include borrowing, cash reserves, tax forecasts 
and outturn, the urgent need for transparency and accessibility to budgetary data will increase.  
Box 4.4:  Complexity of the new arrangements 
The new fiscal framework to manage the Scottish budget is inherently complex. It is without 
precedent internationally.  
The consequence however, will be a budget process that does not lend itself to transparency. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, assessing the overall path for Scottish public spending in the 
future will require a complex mix of forecasts of UK public spending, UK taxation and Scottish 
devolved taxes.  
In addition to that however, forecast error, the use of borrowing powers and the new Scotland 
Reserve will also have to be factored in.  
To take just one example – the practical implementation of the Block Grant Adjustment and its 
reconciliation with actual tax receipts will involve years of estimates, revised forecasts, 
reconciliations and adjustment that will build on top of each other each year.  
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The first stage in the process will be to calculate the baseline Barnett block grant. This will then 
be adjusted, firstly by the UK Government’s favoured approach of ‘Comparable Deduction’ for 
the BGA and then reconciled with the Scottish Government’s favoured methodology, ‘Index 
Deduction Per Capita’. This will be based upon a forecast for comparable rUK tax receipts by 
the OBR. Around the same time, the Scottish Fiscal Commission will forecast future devolved 
tax revenues in Scotland, including for income tax perhaps using a different model, 
assumptions and data to the OBR. 
On top of this, actual tax receipts might not be known with certainty until a much later date – in 
the context of income tax 18 months after the end of the financial year!  
If revenues turn out to be lower than forecast, the BGA for the next year (i.e. two years after 
the year in question) will be adjusted to make up the difference between planned and forecast 
revenues. The Scottish Government will then have the opportunity to borrow or use its 
reserves to pay off the difference. Any borrowing can be repaid over five years.  
This will occur each and every year, so very quickly changes in budget lines will become 
inherently more complicated on a scale not yet witnessed. Any one-year’s budget figures will 
be influenced by a multitude of different repayment and reconciliations. Finding a way to make 
this accessible to promote scrutiny and accountability will be crucial.  
The Scottish Government could also do more to improve the information on the long-term 
financial costs and benefits of policy decisions. There is little assessment of the risks around 
future spending plans, and how these risks are being managed. Relatively little information is 
provided on Government’s assets and liabilities.  
The Auditor General has repeatedly underlined the need for better information on long-term 
public sector spending commitments, including in areas such as aggregate pension liabilities. At 
the same time, information on NPD/PPP commitments, whilst it exists, is not always presented in 
a very transparent way – particularly in relation to which portfolio budgets will bear future costs. 
As the Scottish Government’s fiscal powers expand – to include borrowing, cash reserves, tax 
forecasts and outturn – the need for transparency and accessibility to budgetary data increases.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
With the Scottish Government facing a tough and uncertain fiscal outlook, it is more essential 
than ever that budgetary plans are made on a strategic basis.  
This means a more explicit focus on the outcomes that policymakers expect their policies to 
achieve, and how the resources allocated will help support their delivery.   
The Budget process should place less emphasis on policy commitments expressed in terms of 
inputs. And the budget process should be about looking back at effectiveness as much as it is 
about looking forward. 
The Scottish Government now has much greater scope than in the past to vary its budget. 
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Decisions around borrowing involve trading off the benefits of increased capital investment today 
against repayment costs in future. Tax policy decisions involve even greater trade-offs. Achieving 
an appropriate balance between revenue raising, redistribution, and incentives for growth will be 
challenging – and potentially even more so once behavioural responses and the scope for policy 
spill-overs are taken into account. 
In this complex and uncertain environment, it is more important than ever that the budget process 
is undertaken in a transparent and open way. Opportunity for scrutiny is essential, as is a 
willingness to challenge existing and past assumptions and commitments. Greater transparency 
around existing and planned spending decisions and commitments is a critical in informing the 
scrutiny process. 
Underpinning this all is a need for an overall strategy outlining the role that fiscal policy will play in 
achieving the government’s core economic and social objectives. The links between the core 
vision of government, the overall fiscal strategy, and its budget should be clear and explicit.  
Here at the Fraser of Allander Institute, we look forward to contributing to this debate in the 
months and years to come. 
 
 
 
 
  
As part of a leading technological University and 
Scotland’s number one business school, we understand 
the importance of global thinking. 
We introduced the irst one year full time MBA to the 
UK in 1966 and we continue to introduce innovative 
Masters programmes and bespoke executive education 
to suit the demands of an evolving business world.
Our Department of Economics is home to the Fraser 
of Allander Institute, Scotland’s leading independent 
economic research institute. The department offers  
a range of postgraduate programmes suitable for 
those wishing to develop a career in a wide range 
of industry sectors.
• MSc Applied Economics 
• MSc Economics & Finance 
• MSc Global Energy Management 
• MSc Global Sustainable Cities
 
www.strath.ac.uk/business
A world leading 
business school 
on your doorstep
Fraser of Allander Institute
Department of Economics
Strathclyde Business School
University of Strathclyde
199 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0QU
 
+44 (0) 141 548 3958
fraser@strath.ac.uk
www.strath.ac.uk/fraser
  @Strath_FAI
the place of useful learning
